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PENNSYLVANIA'S ANTIBID-RIGGING ACT: A FIRST STEP
TOWARDS AN ANTITRUST LAW OR THE
ONLY STEP?
ELLEN F. KANDELLt
The author analyzes Pennsylvania's recently enacted Antibid-Rig-
ging Act in the context of the state's dearth of antitrust law and
predicts the effect of the Act on future antitrust measures within
the Commonwealth.
I. INTRODUCTION
P ENNSYLVANIA'S new Antibid-Rigging Act (the Act) became
effective on December 27, 1983.' The Commonwealth joins
at least eleven other states with similar laws. 2 An antibid-rigging
statute is particularly significant in Pennsylvania because the
Commonwealth is the only state in the nation that has no antitrust
statute.3
State Senator Jeanette F. Reibman introduced the Act in re-
sponse to ever-increasing evidence 4 that bid-rigging in the high-
t Legal Counsel, Senator Jeanette F. Reibman. B.S., University of Mary-
land, 1976; J.D., Temple University School of Law, 1982. Member, Penn-
sylvania and Maryland Bar. The author wishes to thank Marc I. Steinberg, Esq.
for reviewing the article and Bonita Gingrich for secretarial assistance. The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. Antibid-Rigging Act of 1983, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1611-1620 (Pur-
don Supp. 1984-85). The text of the Act is appended to this article.
2. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-251 to -258 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-161a (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.11-2
(Smith-Hurd 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325D.49-.66 (West 1981); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 75-21-15 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-205 (1983); N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 103-e (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 133-23 to -33 (1983); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 115 (West Supp. 1984-85); VA. CODE §§ 59.1-68.6 to -68.8
(1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.18.120 (1977).
3. See generally Katz & Horwitz, The Need for a Legislative Antitrust Policy in
Pennsylvania, 83 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1978); Comment, Pennsylvania Antitrust Law:
What Is the Commonwealth's Policy on Competition?, 19 DuQ.. L. REV. 731 (1981).
4. In 1979, the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Jus-
tice began an investigation into bid-rigging at the federal level, which has since
become the largest criminal antitrust investigation in the Department's history.
Yunker, Antitrust Showdown at the Last Chance Gulch, NAT'L LAwJ., Jan. 23, 1984, at
1, 33. See also Highway Robbery, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1982, at 17 (since 1979, 124
corporations and 147 individuals have been convicted of bid-rigging on highway
or airport projects in fourteen states); Highway Robbery, transcript no. 1758, show
no. 7258 of the MacNeil-Lehrer Report (New York: Public Broadcasting Corp.,
(63)
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way paving and road building industries had become so pervasive
as to be considered part of the normal course of business. 5 So-
phisticated bid-rigging conspiracies had been uncovered in ap-
proximately twenty states, including Pennsylvania. 6 Economists
estimated that these conspiracies could inflate building and con-
struction contracts by as much as thirty percent. 7 Between De-
cember, 1979, and March, 1983, the United States Department of
Justice filed 215 criminal actions against 183 corporations and
210 individuals in the highway building industry alone. 8 Fines
totaling $44 million have been recovered. 9
Before the new legislation was enacted, Pennsylvania had lit-
tle protection against bid-rigging in the letting of public con-
tracts. Although such conduct is prohibited under federal
antitrust laws,10 prosecution by the United States Department of
Justice was insufficientII and the Commonwealth's Attorney Gen-
eral possessed only limited power to enforce the federal man-
dates. 12 Thus, the primary avenues of recourse against bid-
rigging were state actions for fraud or conspiracy, with their at-
June 23, 1982). For a discussion of the legislative history of the Pennsylvania
act, see infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
5. See Flax, The Crackdown on Colluding Roadbuilders, FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 1983, at
79, 80 (quoting Gregory Simmons, special agent of the Department of Trans-
portation, as saying, "I have no doubt that it [bid-rigging] is going on every-
where."). In the largest of the Justice Department's criminal antitrust
prosecutions, the participants in the alleged $366 million conspiracy reportedly
"met openly and repeatedly, exchanging prices . . . in an unabashed, business-
as-usual manner . . . even exchanging computer bid preparation data."
Yunker, supra note 4, at 33. See United States v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 576 F.
Supp. 1384 (W.D. Pa. 1983). See also Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3, at 17.
6. Flax, supra note 5, at 79; MacNeil-Lehrer transcript no. 1758, supra note
4, at 1.
7. MacNeil-Lehrer transcript no. 7258, supra note 4, at 4 ("economists'
studies have shown that you tend to get a 10- to 30-percent increase in the price
[of a competitively bid contract] as a result of a price-fixing"). See also Flax, supra
note 5, at 80 (federal prosecutors were unable to pinpoint the actual total cost of
bid-rigging, but there has been a 20% drop in bid estimate since prosecution
began in 1980).
8. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACTIONS BEING TAKEN TO
DEAL WITH BID RIGGING IN THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY PROGRAM 7 (Report to the
Chairman of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, May
23, 1983).
9. Id.
10. For a discussion of the prohibitions of the federal antitrust laws, see
infra notes 124-43 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the inadequacies of the federal prosecution, see infra
notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the Attorney General's limited enforcement powers,
see infra notes 144-77 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30: p. 63
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tendant problems of proof.'3 Conduct which did not evidence
the requisite criminal intent was not sanctioned.1
4
Pennsylvania law does require that most public contracts be
let through a competitive bidding process, whereby sealed bids
are submitted and the contract is awarded to the lowest responsi-
ble bidder.' 5 Indeed, the state constitution mandates such com-
13. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 903 (Purdon 1983) (prohibiting criminal
conspiracy); id. §§ 4101-4116 (prohibiting criminal fraud, including deceptive
business practices). In order to prove criminal conspiracy, the state must first
prove that the underlying conduct is criminal. Id. § 903(a). Before the passage
of the Act, bid-rigging did not constitute criminal conduct. Bid-rigging might,
in some instances, be prohibited as tampering with records, or as forgery, a de-
ceptive business practice. Id. §§ 4101, 4104, 4107. If the bid-rigging activity fits
the definition of one of these offenses, the state could prosecute. To prove a
conspiracy, the state would have to demonstrate specific intent to commit the
crime as well as an agreement among the defendants in furtherance of commit-
ting the crime. Id. § 903(a). Bid-rigging, however, does not always fall within
the definitions of Pennsylvania's criminal fraud offenses. Even when it does, it
may be factually difficult to prove specific fraudulent intent and an agreement
among the parties.
14. See, e.g., Letter from Philadelphia District Attorney Edward G. Rendell
to Senator FrankJ. O'Connell (June 22, 1983) (advocating passage of an antibid-
rigging bill and demonstrating the need for such legislation with an example of a
case of unfair bidding on a city contract which went unpunished due to insuffi-
cient evidence of the criminal intent required by existing statutes). Proof of the
crime of forgery requires a showing of "intent to defraud or injure" someone, or
"knowledge that [one] is facilitating a fraud or injury." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 4101(a) (Purdon 1983). The offense of tampering with records or identifica-
tion involves the "intent to deceive or injure anyone or to conceal any wrongdo-
ing." Id. § 4104(a). Conviction for the offense of deceptive business practices
has been held to require a misrepresentation which is knowingly or recklessly
deceptive. Glessner v. Twig, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 727 (Somerset Co. C.C.P. 1982).
15. There is a significant body of statutory law requiring competitive bid-
ding on public contracts in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 1802 (Purdon 1956 & Supp. 1984-85) (county contracts in excess of $4000);
id. § 2315 (any county contract for construction or renovation of public build-
ings); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 7-751 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (school district
construction, renovation or building repair contracts in excess of $4000); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-404 (Purdon 1961) (state highway contracts); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 1003 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (city contracts for construction or
renovation of public buildings in excess of $4000); id. § 46402 (borough con-
tracts in excess of $4000); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 638 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85)
(state construction contracts under the control of the Department of General
Services in excess of $25,000); id. § 1707.11 (construction contracts under the
control of the General State Authority in excess of $1500); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§ 1622 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (concerning timing of the award of public con-
tracts generally). Administrative regulations also mandate competitive bidding
in many cases. See, e.g., 4 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 69.4 (Shepard's 1984) (all Com-
monwealth contracts, with just five exceptions, must be awarded by a process of
competitive sealed bidding). Where the contract involves multiple awards, com-
petitive sealed proposals, sole source procurement, emergency procurement, or
a small purchase, competitive sealed bidding is not required. See id. §§ 69.3, .5-
.9.
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has stated:
19851
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petitive bidding.16 Violation of these laws and regulations can
result in a business' suspension or debarment from bidding on
future Commonwealth contracts.1 7 However, this administrative
sanction, although a potentially powerful weapon, is an inade-
quate remedy when a criminal conspiracy exists.
Accordingly, there was a clear need for antibid-rigging legis-
lation, Senator Reibman first introduced the bill at the end of the
1981-1982 session of the Pennsylvania General Assembly.' 8 It
was reintroduced on February 4, 1983.19 After numerous amend-
ments, both houses of the legislature passed the bill unanimously,
The law in the field is that even in the absence of a constitutional or
statutory requirement that a contract be awarded to the lowest respon-
sible bidder, if in fact the public authority invites bids, public policy and
the economical conduct of government business require that the con-
tract be awarded to the lowest possible bidder.
American Totalisator Co. v. Seligman, 27 Pa. Commw. 639, 644, 367 A.2d 756,
758 (1976), arf'd, 34 Pa. Commw. 391, 384 A.2d 242 (1977), exceptions dismissed,
34 Pa. Commw. 436, 384 A.2d 266 (1978), afd, 489 Pa. 568, 414 A.2d 1037
(1980) (citing Bailey v. Gordon, 67 Pa. D. & C. 411, 59 Dauph. 455 (1948);
Sullivan v. Grosscup, 42 Dauph. 323 (1936)). Thus, with a few statutorily man-
dated exceptions, competitive bidding on public contracts is the rule in Penn-
sylvania. For examples of these exceptions, see 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 773. 101 (Purdon 1968 & Supp. 1984-85) (state purchase of steel from United
States companies rather than foreign suppliers who discriminate against Penn-
sylvania products); id. § 635.1 (state purchase of goods and services from the
handicapped); 4 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 69.8 (1984) (relating to emergency
purchases).
Detailed discussion of government procurement practices and the competi-
tive bidding process is beyond the scope of this article. For further information,
see generally COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PURCHASING (2d ed. 1983); Adler, State and Local Government Procurement, 53 PA.
B.A.Q. 154 (1982).
16. PA. CONST. art. III, § 22. This provision of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion states:
The General Assembly shall maintain by law a system of competitive
bidding under which all purchases of materials, printing, supplies or
other personal property used by the government of this Common-
wealth shall so far as practicable be made. The law shall provide that
no officer or employee of the Commonwealth shall be in any way inter-
ested in any purchase made by the Commonwealth under contract or
otherwise.
Id.
17. See, e.g., 4 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 60.3 (Shepard's 1984) (providing for dis-
qualification from bidding on Department of General Services contracts); 67 PA.
ADMIN. CODE § 457.3 (Shepard's 1984) (providing for disqualification from bid-
ding on Department of Transportation contracts). The Department of Trans-
portation also requires prequalification of bidders, including establishment of
competence and responsibility, before a bid will be considered. 36 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 670-404.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85); 67 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 457.3
(Shepard's 1984).
18. S. 1653, 166th Pa. Cong. (1982).
19. S. 199, 167th Pa. Cong. (1983).
[Vol. 30: p. 63
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and on October 28, 1983, Governor Thornburgh signed it into
law.20
The Act establishes the crime of bid-rigging 2' and provides
for criminal, civil penalty, and damage actions for violations. 22
Bid-rigging occurs when two or more persons agree to determine
or fix in advance the successful bidder on a contract or subcon-
tract let by any governmental agency. 23 Any form of agreement
relating to bid submission is prohibited. 24 Such activity is classi-
fied as a third degree felony with concomitant fines and imprison-
ment.25 The Attorney General and district attorneys have
concurrent authority for criminal prosecution. 26 In addition, the
Attorney General may bring an action for civil penalties and dam-
ages. 27 Finally, a person who has engaged in bid-rigging may be
suspended or debarred from bidding on subsequent Common-
wealth contracts. 28
The purpose of this article is to provide a detailed analysis of
the Act as an aid to its interpretation, and to discuss its signifi-
cance in light of the existing antitrust protection in the Common-
wealth. First, the specific types of protection provided by the
statute are examined. Following a consideration of existing anti-
trust protection in the Commonwealth, the article then suggests
how the new Act will affect the present statutory and common law
scheme. After reviewing the history of Pennsylvania's unsuccess-
ful attempts to enact antitrust legislation, the article posits several
explanations for the Commonwealth's unusual posture in this
area. Finally, it answers the question posed at the outset: Is the
new Act a foundation for future antitrust law in Pennsylvania, or
is it the only protection which will be afforded in the near future?
II. ANALYSIS OF PENNSYLVANIA'S ANTIBID-RIGGING ACT
The Act gives law enforcement officials a powerful tool to
protect the Commonwealth from hidden overcharges that in-
crease the cost of goods and services which it purchases.
Although the Act is a strong measure, it is not unreasonably puni-
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1611 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
21. Id. § 1613(a).
22. Id. §§ 1613(c)-(d), 1614.
23. Id. § 1612.
24. Id. § 1614(a).
25. Id. § 1613(c).
26. Id. § 1618(a).
27. Id. § 1618(b).
28. Id. § 1615.
5
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tive. It was modeled after North Carolina's bid-rigging statute.29
In Pennsylvania, however, unlike North Carolina, 30 there was no
prior law in this area. 3 1 Thus, it was necessary to create a com-
plete scheme defining the prohibited conduct, establishing fines
and penalties, and providing for enforcement.
This section provides a detailed analysis and critique of key
provisions of the Act in light of its legislative history.
A. Definitions and Scope of the Act
1. Definitions
Any alteration or predetermination of bids which are submit-
ted for a government contract and paid for with public funds vio-
lates the competitive bidding process and is prohibited under the
Act.3 2 The exact nature of the prohibited activity is delineated in
the Act's definition of bid-rigging.33 An agreement between two
or more persons as to the outcome of a bid is the crucial element
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 133-23 to -33 (Supp. 1983).
30. When North Carolina's antibid-rigging statute was enacted in 1981,
that state already had detailed antitrust legislation, modeled after federal stat-
utes, which served as a basis for defining prohibited activity. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1 (Supp. 1983) (prohibiting agreements in restraint of trade); id. § 75-2
(1981) (providing that agreements in restraint of trade which violate common
law principles also violate the statute). By defining prohibited activity under the
antibid-rigging act as activity which violates § 75-1 or § 75-2 of the state's anti-
trust law, North Carolina's antibid-rigging act incorporated existing state anti-
trust law and common law principles into its definition. See id. § 133-24 (Supp.
1983). For a discussion of the North Carolina law incorporated in its antibid-
rigging statute, see generally Aycock, North Carolina Law on Antitrust and Consumer
Protection, 60 N.C.L. REv. 207 (1982).
31. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's statutory void in the antitrust area,
see supra note 3 and accompanying text and infra notes 241-71 and accompany-
ing text.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1612-1613 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). Compet-
itive bidding is required on most government contracts. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text. Theoretically, competitive bidding fosters competition,
secures the best goods for the lowest price, and reduces the likelihood of fraud
among government purchasing officials. The typical sealed-bid procedure, how-
ever, whereby bids are opened publicly with full identification of each buyer's
price and specifications, is believed by the economists to promote collusion. See
Kamerschen, An Economic Approach to the Detection and Proof of Collusion, 17 AM.
Bus. L.J. 193 (1979); Kamerschen & Sirmans, Methods of Awarding Appraisal Con-
tracts: An Economic Analysis, 51 THE APPRAISALJ. 569, 578-81 (1983). But see An-
not., 81 A.L.R.3d 979, 981-82 (1977) (awarding of public contracts through a
competitive bidding system protects public from collusive contracts).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1612 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). Bid-rigging is
defined as "[t]he concerted activity of two or more persons to determine in ad-
vance the winning bidder of a contract let or to be let for competitive bidding by
a governmental agency." Id.
[Vol. 30: p. 63
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of bid-rigging.3 4 Beyond a simple agreement, there must be an
additional quantum of activity which rises to the level of a combi-
nation, conspiracy, or collusion.3 5 From the language of the stat-
ute, it appears that there must be a criminal motive among the
parties to the agreement.3 6 To establish a bid-rigging conspiracy,
the prosecuting authorities must show that the defendants had
the specific intent to commit the offense.3 7 In addition, they must
allege and prove that these individuals committed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 38 This definition of bid-rigging is
followed by a comprehensive list of prohibited practices, which
includes submitting identical bids to sell goods or services at a
fixed price and sharing profits or establishing territories in order
to limit competition.39
It would seem, then, that the Act's definition of bid-rigging
implicitly renders such conduct criminal.40 Yet, this component
34. Id. In addition to the prohibition on "concerted activity" in § 1612, the
Act also specifically prohibits the following:
(1) Agreeing to sell items or services at the same price.
(2) Agreeing to submit identical bids.
(3) Agreeing to rotate bids.
(4) Agreeing to share profits with a contractor who does not submit
the low bid.
(5) Submitting prearranged bids, agreed upon higher or lower bids,
or other complementary bids.
(6) Agreeing to set up territories to restrict competition.
(7) Agreeing not to submit bids.
Id.
35. Id. § 1613(a). The statute provides that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any
person to conspire, collude or combine with another in order to commit or at-
tempt to commit bid-rigging" on government contracts and subcontracts. Id.
This part of the definition of bid-rigging is derived from the North Carolina
statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-24 (Supp. 1983). In that statute, the defini-
tion is augmented by incorporation of existing North Carolina law. See supra
note 30. In other statutes, this § 1613(a)-type language is the only definition of
prohibited conduct. See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 59.1-68.6 to -68.8 (Supp. 1982).
36. The inference of a requirement of criminal motive is drawn from use of
language similar to that in § 1613(a) of the Act in other Pennsylvania criminal
statutes. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 302(b)(1), 305(a)(2), 307(a)(1),
903(a) (Purdon 1983). In addition, classification of bid-rigging as a third degree
felony indicates that a criminal motive may be required. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
73, § 1613(e) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
37. This requirement is drawn from the elements necessary to establish a
criminal conspiracy. See 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 903(a) (Purdon 1983).
38. See id. § 903(e). In order to establish attempted bid-rigging, which is
prohibited under § 1613(a) of the Act, the law on the inchoate crime of attempt
requires the prosecutor to prove that the accused individuals had the specific
intent to rig bids and that they took a substantial step toward affecting the out-
come of a contract award. See id. § 903(a).
39. For a list of the prohibited activities, see supra note 34.




Kandell: Pennsylvania's Antibid-Rigging Act: A First Step towards an Antit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
of the definition is inconsistent with those parts of the Act gov-
erning civil actions and alternative sanctions. 4 1 Must one infer
that these provisions, by referring to the prohibited activities, re-
ally imply a prerequisite of criminal motive? And if criminal activ-
ity is not present or there is insufficient evidence to establish a
conspiracy, does that mean that the conduct is not unlawful?
Probably not, since it is clear that the legislature intended non-
criminal activity to be actionable as well. A reading of the liability
provisions of the Act in their entirety supports this position.42
Perhaps this statutory ambiguity could be remedied by insertion
of a noncriminal definition of bid-rigging and a prohibition
thereof. The language which criminalizes the conduct could then
be placed in a separate section providing for criminal sanctions.
2. Scope
Bid-rigging, by its definition, is a violation against the Com-
monwealth. Since it involves only those contracts let by a govern-
mental agency, the scope of the Act is limited.43 Thus, the law is
designed to redress harm to the agency or jurisdiction letting the
contract. Enforcement rests solely with public officials. 4 4 Private
parties are not afforded any rights or remedies under the Act.
B. Fines, Penalties & Imprisonment
Since the Act charts new territory for Pennsylvania, it estab-
lishes a comprehensive scheme of sanctions. First, it makes bid-
rigging a third degree felony,45 with accompanying fines and im-
prisonment. 46 Second, in lieu of criminal prosecution, the Act
41. Id. §§ 1613(d), (g), 1614-1615. For a discussion of the alternative rem-
edies under the Act, see infra notes 45-88 and accompanying text.
42. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1613(c)-(e), (g), 1614-1615, 1618 (Purdon
Supp. 1984).
43. Id. § 1620.
44. Id. § 1618. For a discussion of the enforcement scheme under the Act,
see infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1613(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). The original
draft of the bill classified bid-rigging as a second degree felony, but did provide
for imprisonment. Memorandum from F. Murray Bryan, on Behalf of Associ-
ated Pennsylvania Constructors, to All Interested Parties (April 29, 1983), at 2-3
(discussing amendments to proposed Antibid-Rigging Act, S. 199, 167 Pa.
Cong. (1983)). The proposed Act was amended to make bid-rigging a third de-
gree felony, consistent with the grading of offenses in the Crimes Code. Compare
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 106(b)(4)-(5), 1103 (Purdon 1983) with PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 1613(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1613(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (providing a
maximum of a $1,000,000 fine for entities other than individuals, a $50,000 fine
for individuals, and/or a three year term of imprisonment). The provisions for
[Vol. 30: p. 63
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gives the Attorney General the right to seek a civil penalty. 47 Fi-
nally, it provides for a civil damages action48 as well as for admin-
istrative sanctions. 49
An interesting feature of the Act is its enumeration of three
factors which the court is directed to review in determining the
amount of civil penalty or criminal fine, or the term of imprison-
ment. At a minimum, the court must consider the following: the
individual's prior record and number of previous violations, his
or her net worth, and the size and dollar amount of the contract. 50
This permits the court, within the guidelines of the Act, to fashion
a sanction which is appropriate to the nature and magnitude of
the violation in question.
C. Damages
The Act affords any governmental agency which was a party
to a contract affected by prohibited bid-rigging conduct a right of
action for damages against participants in the prohibited con-
duct.5' In the final draft, the legislation provided for mandatory
court-ordered restitution.52 Restitution is arguably a proper rem-
fines and imprisonment in the Pennsylvania Act mirror those found in the fed-
eral Sherman Act. Compare id. with 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Penalties for violation
of the Sherman Act were increased in 1974 under the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act of 1976. See 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). These provisions designated
violation of the statute to be a felony and raised the maximum term for impris-
onment to three years. Id. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-25 (Supp. 1983)
(designating bid-rigging to be a class H felony, with a maximum fine of $100,000
for individuals and/or a maximum prison sentence of ten years under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-1.1 (1981)).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1613(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (providing for
a $100,000 maximum penalty). Many states impose a civil penalty, similar to a
fine but without the criminal consequences, for bid-rigging and similar viola-
tions. Memorandum from John L. Shearburn to Eugene F. Waye, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Antitrust Section, Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania
(June 3, 1983). These penalties range from a $25,000 maximum for individuals
in some states to a $1,000,000 maximum for entities other than individuals in
other states. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93, § 9 (West 1984) ($25,000
limit, but treble damages available); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.40
(Vernon Supp. 1984) (adopting Sherman Act limit of $1,000,000 for corporate
violators).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1613(g), 1614 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). For a
discussion of the remedy of a civil action for damages as provided in the Act, see
infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1613(g), 1615 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). For a
discussion of the available administrative sanctions under the Act, see infra notes
63-88 and accompanying text.
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1613(f) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
51. Id. §§ 1613(g), 1614.
52. S. 199, 167th Pa. Cong., § 3(b) (1983). The bill required the court to
order restitution pursuant to § 1106 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. Id.; see
1985]
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edy in light of (1) the loss suffered by a governmental agency
through inflated prices and (2) the fraudulent activity which se-
cured the contract. 53 Unfortunately this provision was deleted
when the bill was amended in committee.5 4 As a result, restitu-
tion can be obtained only through a separate action for
damages. 55
The requirement that damages be sought in a separate action
constitutes a substantial deterrent to full relief, since it places a
greater burden on the already strained resources of state and lo-
cal agencies. Moreover, judicial and prosecutorial resources are
wasted when parties are forced to file multiple actions. In es-
sence, defense counsel and their clients are the only beneficiaries
of this provision. 56
As to the measure of damages, the Act provides for treble the
actual damages plus the cost of suit, including attorney's fees. 57
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1106 (Purdon 1983) (relating to restitution for inju-
ries to persons or property as a result of criminal conduct).
53. The fundamental objective of restitution as a basis for liability is to pre-
vent unjust enrichment, particularly enrichment of a wrongdoer as a result of his
own unlawful conduct. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 1, 3 (1942); G.
PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1 (1978). The injustice of retaining a
benefit can spring from various sources, including fraud, reliance, inducement,
duress or mistake. G. DOUTHWAITE, ATrORNEY'S GUIDE TO RESTITUTION 7
(1977). In order to be actionable, the unjust enrichment must be based on one
of the specific principles recognized by law or equity. Id. at 20. Federal, state
and local governments have the same rights to restitution as do private parties.
Id. at 339-400. Remedies available on a theory of restitution include recovery of
a money judgment on a quasi-contract, replevin, constructive trust, equitable
lien, subrogation and accounting. G. PALMER, supra, §§ 1.1-.6, at 1-33. For ex-
tensive treatments of the subject of restitution, see generally G. PALMER, supra;
Wade, The Literature of the Law of Restitution, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1968).
54. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1613(b)-(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (pro-
viding for criminal fines, imprisonment, and civil penalties, but not for restitu-
tion). According to the Associated Pennsylvania Constructors, restitution is
more appropriate in an administrative context as a condition to reinstatement
after debarment or suspension. Memorandum from F. Murray Bryan, on Behalf
of Associated Pennsylvania Constructors, to All Interested Parties (April 29,
1983), at 4-5 (discussing amendments to proposed Antibid-Rigging Act, S. 199,
167th Pa. Cong. (1983)).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1614 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). Section 1614,
however, appears to provide for punitive damages in the form of trebling actual
damages. See id Punitive damages are not properly termed a restitutionary rem-
edy because the object of restitution is not to punish or deter, but rather to
restore the status quo. See G. DOUTHWAITE, supra note 53, at 323.
56. Defendants are benefitted in that the necessity for multiple actions in-
creases the likelihood that the government will not have the resources to seek
civil damages in every case. Defendants also benefit from greater bargaining
power in the administrative context or the precomplaint stage. Given the bur-
den and expense of a separate civil damages action, the Attorney General's of-
fice may be inclined to settle cases rather than pursue full-fledged litigation.
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1614(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
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This provision was derived in part from the North Carolina stat-
ute, which gives the governmental agency the option to elect ac-
tual damages or ten percent of the contract price, which is then
trebled. 58 In bid-rigging cases, actual damages are extremely dif-
ficult to prove. 59 Consequently, North Carolina's ten percent al-
ternative serves as a guide for determining damages. 60 Although
the initial Senate version of Pennsylvania's legislation contained a
similar provision, it was deleted when the bill was amended by the
State Government Committee. 61 Without this guideline, Penn-
sylvania's Act places the onus of proving damages on the govern-
ment, the innocent party.62 The data most material to
establishing damages are generally in the hands of the defendant,
thereby requiring complex, detailed, and timely discovery in or-
der to obtain sufficient proof of actual damages. Thus, although
the Act is designed to protect the government, this provision for
measurement of damages presents serious obstacles to its ability
to recover just compensation.
D. Administrative Sanctions
Administrative sanctions, such as suspension or debarment
from bidding on government contracts, are also available under
the Act. 63 These sanctions are powerful enforcement tools. 64
Suspension is designed to be a temporary penalty, generally
pending an investigation. 65 Debarment follows a finding of viola-
58. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-28(b) (Supp. 1983).
59. Letter from H.A. Cole, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, State of
North Carolina, to Ellen Kandell (Oct. 1, 1982), at 2 (discussing the rationale for
North Carolina's bid-rigging provisions).
60. Id.
61. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1614(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (contain-
ing provision for actual damages only). The committee believed the ten percent
of the contract price measure of damages was an arbitrary standard. Memoran-
dum, supra note 45, at 7-8. But see United States Department ofJustice, Guidelines
for Sentencing Recommendations in Felony Cases Under Sherman Act, in U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, at 11-96 (Aug. 27, 1979) (ten
percent of the contract price recommended factor for determining corporate
fines). See generally ABA, SAMPLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST
CASES 19 (1984).
62. For a discussion of the difficulty of proving damages in an antitrust con-
text, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1615 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
64. For a thorough analysis of administrative sanctions and other methods
of implementing competitive bidding policies, see generally Note, Prescribing Pre-
ventive Remedies for an Ailing Public Construction Industry: Reforms Under the New Mas-
sachusetts Competitive Bidding Statute, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1357 (1982).
65. Id. at 1380.
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tion, and continues for longer periods of time. 66 A firm that has
been disqualified under either procedure cannot do business with
the Commonwealth for the specified term.67 Although these
sanctions are for limited durations, they may have a permanent
effect,68 because firms receiving -a large portion of their business
from government contracts may be forced to close down.
Under the Act, debarment or suspension are discretionary
sanctions which the governmental agency may choose to im-
pose.69 The Act provides a maximum debarment period of three
years for the first finding of prohibited conduct, and five years for
any subsequent findings. 70 A criminal conviction is not a prereq-
uisite for imposing these sanctions. 7' Under a related provision,
66. Id.
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1615(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). For a discus-
sion of the time periods provided in the Act, see infra note 70 and accompanying
text.
68. See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The Gonzales
court observed:
The impact of debarment on a contractor may be a sudden contraction
of bank credit, adverse impact on market price of shares of listed stock
... and critical uneasiness of creditors generally, to say nothing of
"loss of face" in the business community.
Id. at 574. See also Note, supra note 64, at 1367-68 n.90.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1615(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
70. Id. Cf MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 44C(1) (West 1982) (maximum
debarment period is five years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-25(b)-(c) (Supp. 1983)
(maximum suspension period is three years from date of conviction). See also 41
C.F.R. §§ 1-1.600 to -1.607 (1984) (federal debarment rules providing a maxi-
mum three year debarment period and a twelve month suspension period).
Under the Act, governmental agencies proceed under their own rules and
regulations regarding debarment and suspension, within the statutory limitation
on the length of the ineligibility period. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1615(a) (Pur-
don Supp. 1984-85). By way of example, two Pennsylvania agencies' regulations
governing suspension and debarment are considered below.
The Department of General Services regulations provide a maximum three
year debarment period, although an additional period may be imposed follow-
ing notice and an opportunity for hearing. 4 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 60.5 (Shepard's
1984). Suspension is a temporary sanction, imposed for a period of investiga-
tion, which generally does not exceed six months. Id. § 60.7(b). Over the past
few years, the Department has debarred four vendors for three years each and
has suspended four others. Memorandum from Lamar E. Shomper, Director,
Bureau of Purchases, Department of General Services, to Vendor Services Sec-
tion, Bureau of Purchases (Feb. 13, 1984). To date, General Services has not
debarred any contractors. Id.
In contrast to General Services' regulatory scheme, the Department of
Transportation has no established guidelines for suspension or debarment. The
procedure is, therefore, one of case-by-case review, with sanctions dependent
upon the severity of the violations. Since 1979, the Department has suspended,
debarred, or refused to renew contracts with 23 firms. Memorandum fromJohn
Hohenwarter, Director of Office of Legislative Affairs, to Senator Jeanette F.
Reibman (March 7, 1984).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1615(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). But cf N.C.
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any agency which participates in the competitive bidding process
is required to keep a list of all suspended or debarred individu-
als. 72 The agency must furnish this list, upon request, to persons
considering submission of a bid on an agency contract. 73 In this
way, individuals who wish to submit a bid are better able to deter-
mine whether other individuals with whom they may be preparing
the bid have been disqualified.74
An integral component of the administrative sanction is the
Act's provision for noncollusion affidavits in which potential bid-
ders must disclose prior bidding misconduct. 75 Since the Depart-
ment of Transportation's prequalification regulations require
similar affidavits, 76 this concept is not new in Pennsylvania.
Under these regulations a potential bidder has an affirmative duty
to disclose financial ability, adequacy of plant and equipment, and
compliance with affirmative action and other regulatory require-
GEN. STAT. § 133-27 (Supp. 1983) (conviction is a prerequisite to suspension).
Although conviction is a prerequisite to suspension under North Carolina law,
governmental agencies may temporarily suspend an indicted individual pending
resolution of the charges against him. Id. North Carolina's statute has survived
a constitutional challenge that the section providing for temporary suspension
violated the presumption of innocence in criminal matters. See Letter, supra note
59, at 2. For a discussion of this constitutional issue, see infra notes 84-88 and
accompanying text.
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1615(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
73. Id.
74. Were it not for this requirement in the Act, an individual preparing a
bid would have to check with all the possible state and local offices of each
agency which could have debarred a potential bidder. A thorough investigation
into the possible debarment of someone with whom one is preparing a bid is
burdensome, inefficient and expensive. However, maintenance of a central
agency-wide list poses the larger and more dangerous risk of inaccurate or stale
information. North Carolina's statute takes a different approach, allowing vari-
ous governmental agencies to develop regulations regarding confidentiality of
bidders. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-33 (Supp. 1983); Letter, supra note 59, at 2-3.
This scheme safeguards against wholesale distribution of potentially damaging
and/or inaccurate information regarding bidders on public contracts.
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1617 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). See also 67 PA.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 457.1-.16 (Shepard's 1983) (Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation regulations requiring all persons proposing to bid on Depart-
ment contracts to prequalify by submitting a sworn statement). Cf MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 44D(a) (West 1982) (requiring general contractors to sub-
mit prequalification statement attesting to their organization, experience, and
financial stability); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-30 (Supp. 1983) (requiring only prime
contractors to submit bids).
76. See supra note 75 and infra notes 77-78. The Department of General
Services, the state's other chief procurement agency, does not, however, have
equivalent prebid requirements. Cf MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 44D(a)
(West 1982) (requiring sworn prequalification statements of all bidders on pub-
lic construction contracts).
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ments. 77 With this information, the Department determines
whether a bidder is competent and responsible and then assigns
the individual a prequalification rating. 78
The noncollusion affidavit is an important tool for enforce-
ment. Information about an individual's prior bidding miscon-
duct is relevant to the issue of his or her integrity and ability to
perform future work. Accordingly, the government agency solic-
iting bids is entitled to notification of any malfeasance with re-
spect to bidding on a public contract. The requirement that each
agency maintain its own list of excluded persons is of limited
value for these purposes, since a single list will contain only the
names of those persons subject to administrative sanctions by one
particular agency.79 To obtain a complete list, one would have to
check all state and local agencies. For these reasons, information
provided in the noncollusion affidavit, which includes any prior
bidding misconduct, is especially important. 80 It is critical in
helping protect the Commonwealth from (1) contractors who
come into Pennsylvania after being debarred in another state, or
(2) contractors who had been doing business in one locality and,
as a result of misconduct, moved to another. Without the ad-
vance disclosure provided by this affidavit, an agency's ability to
examine the integrity of a prospective bidder and thereby protect
the Commonwealth from unscrupulous conduct would be greatly
hampered.
Unfortunately, however, this section of the Act is not likely to
be fully effective because it gives full discretion to the agencies
regarding bid disqualification. 8' When agency regulations im-
pose a duty to submit an affidavit, neglect of that duty should
have a mandatory sanction, such as automatic disqualification of
the bid. Although the original bill provided for mandatory dis-
77. 67 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 457.3(b) (Shepard's 1983).
78. Id. § 457.3(c).
79. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1615(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (requiring
that an agency keep a list of persons ineligible for participation in that agency's
contracts).
80. See id. § 1617. Section 1617 requires the following information in non-
collusion affidavits of bidders:
Any required noncollusion shall state whether or not the person has
been convicted or found liable for any act prohibited by State or Fed-
eral law in any jurisdiction involving conspiracy or collusion with re-
spect to bidding on any public contract within the last three years.
Id.
81. See id. (failure to provide an affidavit when one is required by the gov-
ernmental agency "may be grounds for disqualification").
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qualification,8 2 the present Act does not.8 3 Clearly, the integrity
and responsibility of a bidder is called into question if he cannot
comply with a simple request for information. The penalty of bid
disqualification, therefore, is not an unreasonable one. As it now
stands, the discretionary nature of the penalty dilutes the effec-
tiveness of the Act's noncollusion affidavits.
A separate criticism may be levied against the Act's affidavit
provisions with respect to the proper use of adverse information
contained in the affidavit. That section provides that while infor-
mation regarding prior bidding misconduct may be a ground for
suspension or debarment, it does not necessarily bar a contract
award.8 4 Implicit in this provision is that there be some adminis-
trative procedure before sanctions can be imposed on the basis of
information in the affidavit. 85 Detailed statutory language regard-
ing the effect of the affidavit protects bidders from automatic re-
jections as a result of prior bidding misconduct.8 6 Yet such
protection seems wholly unnecessary. The bidder has no pro-
82. S. 199, 167th Pa. Cong. (1983). Cf N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-30 (Supp.
1983) (requiring mandatory disqualification of bidders who fail to provide an
affidavit).
83. See supra note 81.
84. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1617 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). Section
1617 of the Act also provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Any required noncollusion affidavit shall also state that a person's affi-
davit stating that a person has been convicted or found liable for any
act, prohibited by State or Federal law in any jurisdiction, involving
conspiracy or collusion with respect to bidding on any public contract
within the last three years, does not prohibit a governmental agency
from accepting a bid from or awarding a contract to that person, but
may be a ground for administrative suspension or debarment in the
discretion of a governmental agency under the rules and regulations of
that agency, or, in the case of a governmental agency with no adminis-
trative suspension or debarment regulations or procedures, may be a
ground for consideration on the question of whether such agency
should decline to award a contract to that person on the basis of a lack
of responsibility.
Id.
85. Id. Specifically, language to the effect that adverse information "may be
a ground" for disqualification pursuant to the agency's disqualification rules and
regulations implies that more than mere information about prior misconduct is
necessary. The agency, arguably, must take some step to analyze the veracity of
the information. See id. In the absence of agency regulations and procedures,
disqualifications may be based on a "lack of responsibility." Id. This provision
parallels federal regulations regarding prior misconduct by bidders on public
contracts. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.1205 (1984). No specific procedure is required
under federal law for the determination of responsibility. See Note, supra note
64, at 1388. Moreover, due process is not required for such a determination. Id.
(citing Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co. v. Dunlop, No. 1573 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
86. See Memorandum from F. Murray Bryan, Esq., on Behalf of Associated
Pennsylvania Constructors, to Interested Persons (June 17, 1983).
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tected property interest at stake which would require due pro-
cess. 87 Prior debarment, antitrust violations, and related criminal
activity are already grounds for disqualification under existing
agency regulations. 88 In short, there is no reason why contracting
authorities should not be able to reject bids based on information
contained in the bidder's affidavit. In many instances, such a re-
jection might be desirable.
E. Enforcement
As noted, if there is a violation of the Act, public authorities,
who have exclusive responsibility for enforcement, may choose
from several options to redress the harm to the Commonwealth:
(1) criminal prosecution89 or civil penalties; 90 (2) civil action, in-
cluding a right of action for damages; 9t and (3) administrative
sanctions .92
The Attorney General and local district attorneys have juris-
diction over criminal prosecution under the Act.9 3 Concurrent
jurisdiction is necessary for several reasons. In the case of a large
criminal conspiracy crossing county lines, the Attorney General's
87. For examples of cases in which state courts have upheld the constitu-
tionality of statutes permitting the government to debar contractors on the basis
of previous misconduct, see Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 88 Ill. App. 3d 778, 411
N.E.2d 316 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of statute prohibiting award of
state contracts to a person who has admitted to bribery or attempted bribery of a
public official in the face of a due process argument); Trap Rock Indus. v. Kohl,
63 NJ. 1, 304 A.2d 193 (upholding the constitutionality of governmental debar-
ment of persons convicted of bribery and obstructing justice in the face of equal
protection objections), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 860 (1973). But see Steadman,
"Banned in Boston-Birmingham and Boise and... ": Due Process in Debarment and
Suspension of Government Contractors, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 793 (1976) (criticizing the
current federal debarment procedure and advocating greater due process rights
for debarred contractors).
88. See 4 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 60.3(2), (4), (11) (Shepard's 1984); 67 PA. AD-
MIN. CODE § 457.13(7) (Shepard's 1983).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1613(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). For a discus-
sion of the remedy of criminal prosecution under the Act, see supra notes 45-46
and accompanying text.
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1613(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). For a discus-
sion of the remedy of civil penalties under the Act, see supra note 47 and accom-
panying text.
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1614 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). For a discussion
of the remedy of a civil action for damages under the Act, see supra notes 51-62
and accompanying text.
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1615 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). For a discussion
of the administrative sanctions available under the Act, see supra notes 63-88 and
accompanying text.
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1618(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). Cf 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911(e)(2) (Purdon 1983) (providing concurrent
prosecutorial jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of corrupt organizations).
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power to prosecute94 is both logical and necessary. However,
there have been instances where bidding violations were confined
to a single county. 95 In large counties, the local district attorney
probably has more staff members than the criminal and antitrust
divisions of the Office of Attorney General. Thus, concurrent ju-
risdiction gives the authorities greater resources to combat bid-
rigging.
The Act may also be enforced through a civil action for dam-
ages brought by the Attorney General, on behalf of the Common-
wealth and its agencies. 96 Local government agencies have the
right to bring an action independently, 97 but they must first give
notice to the Attorney General.98 Notification is necessary to co-
ordinate enforcement of the Act as well as to reduce the possibil-
ity of duplicate investigations or enforcement proceedings. 99 In
addition, information received through this notice requirement
enables the Attorney General to detect patterns of prohibited
conduct across the state. Finally, as an alternative to independent
action, a local agency may request the Commonwealth to act on
its behalf at any time.' 00 Such a request would be particularly
appropriate in a jurisdiction where authorities do not possess suf-
94. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 732-205(a)(3)-(4) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85)
(Attorney General has the power to prosecute criminal cases upon the request of
a district attorney who lacks sufficient resources to do so, or upon petition to the
court having jurisdiction over the criminal proceeding).
95. See, e.g., Heidorn & Brizzolara, How a Township Skirted Bidding Laws,
Phila. Inquirer, Aug. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (discussing methods by which town-
ship awarded public contracts without taking competitive bids, including split-
ting large contracts into smaller ones so as to come below the maximum
permitted without bids, and tailoring specifications to ensure that a certain bid-
der would be the only eligible choice). See also Letter, supra note 14 (advocating
the need for antibid-rigging bill in the City of Philadelphia); Fellmeth, Antitrust
Enforcement by Local Prosecutors: Impediments and Prospects, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 3
(1978) (estimating that over 75% of nonmerger antitrust cases filed in the last
three years involved violations which occurred almost entirely within a single
county's borders).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1618(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). See also PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 732-204(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984) (general grant of statutory
authority to Attorney General to bring civil actions on behalf of the Common-
wealth and its agencies).
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1618(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (giving polit-
ical subdivisions, municipal corporations, home rule municipalities and school
districts the right to act independently and to bring an action for damages).
98. Id.
99. Notification furthers the goal of coordination of prosecutorial and judi-
cial resources by permitting consolidation of related pending actions. For an
example of this device in the federal context, see 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1618(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
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ficient staff or expertise to pursue a bid-rigging case
independently.
A critical element of the Act's enforcement scheme is the in-
vestigative powers it bestows upon the Attorney General. The
Act provides that the Attorney General "may require the attend-
ance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, ac-
counts, papers, records, documents and files relating to the civil
investigation."''10 In the antitrust context, it is often difficult to
detect violations without detailed investigation. 0 2 Thus, investi-
gative power is a particularly important enforcement tool in anti-
trust-related prosecutions, such as those under the Act. This
power enables the Attorney General to determine whether there
is a basis for an action and to properly allege violations in a
complaint.10 3
101. Id. § 1619(a). For examples of this civil investigative power in other
state law contexts, see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911() (Purdon Supp. 1984)
(relating to racketeering investigations of corrupt organizations); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 73, § 307-3 (Purdon 1983) (relating to investigatory powers of the Bureau of
Consumer Protection). See also Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3, at 23-24.
The scope of investigative authority and the protection afforded before re-
lease of confidential information under the Act are similar to those provided in
the federal Antitrust Civil Process Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1982) (re-
lating to investigative authority of the United States Attorney General in anti-
trust matters). Under the Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Improvements
Act, information obtained through federal investigations, including pre-com-
plaint investigations, of antitrust violations may be made available to state attor-
neys general. See id. § 15f. See generally Maness, State Antitrust Enforcement: Its
Evolution and Future Direction, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 821 (1982).
Although information gained by United States Attorneys General may be
made available to state officials, it is important to note that the Act prohibits
state criminal prosecution of individuals who have previously faced federal crim-
inal charges based upon the same allegedly illegal conduct. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
73, § 1613(h) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). Thus, although there may be coordi-
nation between state and federal officials, persons indicted under federal law are
protected from being placed in double jeopardy under Pennsylvania law. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (providing that an individual may
not be tried more than once for any given crime).
102. This difficulty is evidenced by the fact that many states' antitrust laws
grant enforcement authorities similar broad investigative powers. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2106 (Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-36-9 (Supp. 1984);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-917 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 59.1-9.10 (1982).
103. For examples of this rationale in the context of federal antitrust inves-
tigations, see Associated Container Transp., Ltd. v. United States, 502 F. Supp.
505 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (purpose of broad investigatory powers is to allow the Jus-
tice Department to investigate antitrust violations without becoming prema-
turely involved in litigation), rev'd on other grounds, 705 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1983);
Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391, 397 (D. Minn. 1963) (pur-
poses of the Antitrust Civil Process Act, providing Attorney General with broad
investigatory powers, is to enable him to determine whether there has been a
violation of antitrust laws and to allege those violations properly in a complaint),
aft'd, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964).
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The government's ability to use information obtained in an
investigation 0 4 is somewhat limited, however, so as to guard
against potential clashes with the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination. 0 5 Still, for the subject of the investigation,
the Act's protection is inadequate against criminal prosecution
because, unlike civil investigation provisions in other statutes, 0 6
there is no express protection of the constitutional right against
self-incrimination. 0 7 The language providing that no criminal
proceeding may be brought "based solely upon" information ob-
tained in a civil investigation is ambiguous.' 0 8 It is unclear what
quantum of evidence beyond that obtained through a civil investi-
gation is necessary to initiate criminal proceedings. 0 9 Moreover,
parallel civil and criminal proceedings may be brought, despite an
implication in the Act that the former must precede the latter."I 0
Thus, the investigative powers provided by the Act give public
authorities an important enforcement tool, as well as the discre-
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1619(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (information
obtained through a civil investigation may not be the sole basis of a criminal
prosecution).
105. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that no person "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. Were state officials al-
lowed to subpoena a person under investigation or otherwise compel produc-
tion of evidence in a civil investigation and then use that evidence in a criminal
prosecution, the state would be accomplishing indirectly what it is forbidden by
the Constitution to do directly. Hence, there is a statutory limitation on use of
evidence obtained in a civil investigation in a simultaneous or subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution.
106. For examples of civil investigation sections of antitrust statutes which
provide express protection of the constitutional right against self-incrimination,
see 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c)(2) (1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2106(h) (Supp.
1982); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-36-9(i)(2) (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 59.1-9.10(k)
(1982). As an added protection, it is clear in most statutes that a civil investiga-
tion cannot substitute for or circumvent the grand jury process; therefore, re-
quests for information in a civil investigation which would be unreasonable or
otherwise protected from disclosure for purposes of a grand jury investigation
are generally prohibited. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c)(1) (1982); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2106(e) (Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-36-9(d) (Supp. 1984);
VA. CODE § 59.1-9.10(b) (1982).
107. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1619(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Under Pennsylvania law, if there is a reasonable conclusion of possible
criminal activity, prosecuting authorities may petition the court to impanel a
grand jury. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4543(b) (Purdon 1981). It is unclear
what role information obtained during a civil investigation may play in reaching
a "reasonable conclusion of possible criminal activity."
110. See, e.g., SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1374-75 (D.C. Cir.)
(parallel federal criminal and civil proceedings are permissible as long as the
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tion and flexibility necessary to pursue civil remedies. However,
the Attorney General's use of information gained in a civil investi-
gation may well be challenged on constitutional grounds in a sub-
sequent criminal prosecution if there is no independent basis for
the latter action.
One area in which the enforcement scheme falters is in its
failure to afford rights or remedies for private parties."' This is
one of the Act's major flaws. Under Pennsylvania case law, it has
been recognized that a disappointed bidder who is also a tax-
payer, and who has demonstrated injury from an improper con-
tract award, has standing to enjoin the award of this contract. 1 2
It follows that an individual injured by a bid-rigging conspiracy
should be entitled to seek relief. Moreover, federal antitrust laws,
which provide generous remedies for private parties, have long
recognized the important role of private individuals in antitrust
enforcement.' '3 If individuals could seek redress under the new
111. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1618(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (granting
the right to a civil cause of action to the Attorney General, political subdivisions,
municipal corporations, home rule municipalities and school districts).
112. See American Totalistor Co. v. Seligman, 27 Pa. Commw. 639, 643,
367 A.2d 756, 758 (1976), affrd, 34 Pa. Commw. 391, 384 A.2d 242 (1977), excep-
tions dismissed, 34 Pa. Commw. 436, 384 A.2d 266 (1978), aff'd, 489 Pa. 568, 414
A.2d 1034 (1980). In American Totalistor, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
stated:
[W]here bids for public contracts are invited and promised to be let to
the lowest responsible competing bidder, a disappointed bidder who is
also a taxpayer has standing to seek to enjoin the award of a public
contract contrary to the promise.
Id.
113. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). The Clayton Act provides the follow-
ing rights to private persons:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any dis-
trict court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. Courts are also authorized to award "simple interest on actual damages"
under certain circumstances. Id.
The absence of a private cause of action and the resulting lack of incentive
for private parties to participate in enforcement processes contributed to a low
level of public support for state antitrust enforcement. Note, The Present Revival
and Future Course of State Antitrust Enforcement, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 581 (1963).
For a discussion of the role of private individuals in advancing the cause of anti-
trust legislation in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
In recognition of the need for public support and the importance of private en-
forcement in building public support, some states have built private incentives
into their antitrust law. See, e.g., Dibble &Jardine, The Utah Antitrust Act of 1979:
Getting into the State Antitrust Business, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 73, 78-79 (Utah state
antitrust laws offer generous remedial provisions and a choice of forum to pri-
vate individuals to encourage private enforcement).
[Vol. 30: p. 63
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Act, a supportive constituency would arise." 4 The invocation of
private remedies is a necessary complement to public enforce-
ment, and Pennsylvania citizens should not be without this
protection.
F. Statute of Limitations
The Act establishes a four-year statute of limitations, and sets
a repose period of ten years from the signing of the contract
within which to bring a lawsuit."l 5 To determine when the limita-
tions period begins, the Act provides that a cause of action arises
when the contracting agency "discovered, or should have discov-
ered" the prohibited conduct. 1 6 By contrast, the general method
of computing periods of limitation in Pennsylvania is from the
time the cause of action arose." 7 At the federal level, an antitrust
action accrues when the defendant commits the injurious act." 8
Only in exceptional situations, where the knowledge of injury is
unattainable because of the laws of nature or because the wrong-
doer commits fraud, does the discovery rule apply." 9
The theory of a discovery rule is that the limitations period
should not run until the injured party learns or should have
114. For a discussion of the role private individuals could play in develop-
ing state antitrust law in Pennsylvania, see infra note 271 and accompanying text.
115. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1614(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). The first
draft of the Act contained a three year limitations period and a fifteen year re-
pose period from the date the contract was signed. S. 199, 167th Pa. Cong.
(1983). The original terms were derived from North Carolina's statute. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 133-28(c) (Supp. 1983); Letter, supra note 59, at 2. The current
provision of a four year limitations period is consistent with federal antitrust law.
See 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982). Cf 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (Purdon 1981)
(establishing a two year limitation for actions for civil penalty or forfeiture where
cause of action is granted in a statute and where government has standing to
bring the action).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1614(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). In its origi-
nal form, the Act provided that the cause of action would arise at the time of
discovery of the conspiracy. S. 199, 167th Pa. Cong. (1983). This provision was
modeled after North Carolina's bid-rigging statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-
28(c) (Supp. 1983); Letter, supra note 59, at 2. The language in the North Caro-
lina statute differs slightly from that in Pennsylvania's Act in that North Caro-
lina's law does not contain the "should have discovered" language found in
Pennsylvania's law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-28(c) (Supp. 1983). For a discus-
sion of the issues raised by the "should have discovered" language in Penn-
sylvania's Act, see infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
117. See 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5502(a) (Purdon 1981).
118. See Curtis v. Campbell-Taggert, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1090 (1982).
119. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir.), cert.
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learned of the activities which establish a cause of action. 120 Ar-
guably, this rule could be said to impose a duty of due diligence
on the government. If so, it is an unreasonably high standard.
An agency would be required to scrutinize carefully all of its com-
petitively bid contracts for indications of suspected activity. Yet
contracting is only one of a myriad of responsibilities performed
by a governmental agency. Moreover, bid-rigging conspiracies,
many of which are quite sophisticated, are extremely difficult to
discover.
A better view would be to read the discovery language as im-
posing a negligence standard, the standard traditionally used in
tort cases. 12 1 In the context of most of the cases arising under
this statute, imposition of the due diligence standard would place
an unreasonable burden on public officials and at the same time
create another impediment to full realization of the statute's
purpose.
III. EXISTING ANTITRUST PROTECTION IN THE COMMONWEALTH
In order to gauge the significance of the Act and to predict its
future effect on state antitrust protection, it is necessary to review
existing trade regulation law in Pennsylvania. Although a com-
prehensive analysis of the antitrust laws is beyond the scope of
this article,' 22 this section will provide a summary of the federal
laws and a discussion of Pennsylvania's limited ability to enforce
the federal mandates. This is followed by a review of common
law protections available under state law.
A. Federal Antitrust Protections
The threshold jurisdictional requirement of any federal anti-
trust prohibition is that the activity in question have some impact
on interstate commerce.123 There are three primary federal anti-
120. See Memorandum, supra note 45, at 9. North Carolina's statute, which
served as the model for the Pennsylvania law, contains no such "discovery rule"
provision. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-28(c) (Supp. 1983) with PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 1614(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
121. See Note, Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. and Statutes of Limitations
in Latent Injury Litigation: An Equitable Expansion of the Discovery Rule, 32 CATH. U.L.
REV. 471, 471 & n.3 (1983) (statute "begins to run when a person discovers or,
in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury").
122. For more thorough discussions of antitrust law, see P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1978); E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER (2d ed.
1973); J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1973).
123. Sections one and two of the Sherman Act apply to prohibited conduct
which affects commerce among the states or with foreign nations. 15 U.S.C.
[Vol. 30: p. 63
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trust laws: the Sherman Act, 124 the Clayton Act,125 and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act.' 26 Of these three statutes, the
Sherman Act is the cornerstone of antitrust law. 127 Section one
prohibits all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of trade.128 Section two outlaws monopolization, attempts to mo-
nopolize, and combinations or conspiracies to monopolize. 29 A
violation of either of these sections is a felony, penalized by fines
and imprisonment. 30 The substantative focus of the Federal
Trade Commission Act is its prohibition against unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.' 3' The
act also established the Federal Trade Commission and granted it
§§ 1-2 (1982). The Federal Trade Commission Act applies to activity within the
United States, any State or Territory, and in limited circumstances, to trade with
foreign nations. Id. § 45(a). The Clayton Act applies to activity within the
United States and its territories. Id. § 13(a). See generally E. KINTNER, supra note
122, at 18-19.
124. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
125. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1982)).
126. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982)).
127. The Sherman Act is properly denominated the cornerstone of anti-
trust law because, as the first federal mandate in this area, its scope is broad.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, in-
tended "to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining
trust and monopoly agreements." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944). See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469, 495 (1940) (Congress has the power to suppress restraints on interstate
commerce).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, in perti-
nent part, that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. For a discussion of how
courts have construed this prohibition, see infra notes 135-43 and accompanying
text.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides, in perti-
nent part, that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions," is guilty of a felony. Id. For a discussion of the elements of § 2 offenses,
see Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3, at 4-6.
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). Violation of either § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman
Act can result in a maximum three year term of imprisonment and/or a maxi-
mum fine of $1,000,000 for corporations and $100,000 for other persons. Id.
131. Id. § 45(a). Section 45(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce"
are unlawful. Id. Section 45(a) does not apply to trade with foreign nations,
other than import commerce, unless such trade has a "direct, substantial, and
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authority to take actions against these practices.' 32 Finally, the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,
prohibits price discrimination when the effect of such discrimina-
tion is to reduce competition or to tend to create a monopoly in
any line of interstate commerce. 133 The Clayton Act also pro-
vides a private cause of action and recovery of treble damages for
individuals injured by violations of the federal antitrust laws. 134
In general, conduct said to have a pernicious effect on com-
petition and to be of no redeeming virtue is deemed a per se vio-
lation of the antitrust laws and, in particular, of section one of the
Sherman Act.13 5 Examples of such activity include price fixing,
dividing of markets, tying arrangements, and group boycotts.' 36
When any of these practices are at issue, courts deem it unneces-
sary to inquire into the purpose or effect of these activities on
competition. 137 Given that there need be no actual showing of
132. Id. §§ 41, 45(a)(2). For a more thorough discussion of the Federal
Trade Commission, see E. KINTNER, supra note 122, at 13.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality,
where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination
are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consump-
tion or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the
jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimi-
nation may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
Id.
134. Id. § 15. Private parties may also seek injunctive relief to halt continu-
ing violations of antitrust law. See id. § 26.
135. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (railroad's
preferential routing agreements were per se violations of the Sherman Act).
See also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 385-
89 (1956) (discussing the development of and rationale for the judicial interpre-
tation of the Sherman Act under which "some agreements and practices are in-
valid per se, while others are illegal only as applied to particular situations").
For a discussion of the effect of a finding of per se illegality, see infra notes 136-
37 and accompanying text.
136. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying
arrangements deemed to be per se unlawful), Fashion Originators' Guild v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts deemed to be per se unlawful);
United States v. Sacony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing is per
se unlawful); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898), aftd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (division of markets deemed per se unlawful).
137. See Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5. The Northern Pacific Court described
the effect of finding a per se violation as follows:
[The] principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of
24
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the effect on competition, it is no defense that the amount of in-
terstate commerce affected is small.' 3 8
Where the trade restraint is not a per se violation, the re-
straint must be unreasonable to come within the proscription of
the antitrust laws.' 3 9 The standard analysis is the rule of reason,
under which all of the pertinent facts and circumstances of a case
are carefully scrutinized.' 40 If a particular trade practice imposes
an unreasonable restraint on competition, it violates the Sherman
Act.' 4 1 But when the challenged activities are wholly intrastate, it
must be shown that they place a direct and substantial restraint on
interstate commerce. 142  Purely local activity whose effect is
equally local, then, is obviously beyond the reach of federal anti-
trust law. ' 43
restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the
benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in
an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable.
Id.
138. United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584, 588 (8th Cir. 1970) (the
illegality of price fixing did not depend on the amount of interstate commerce
affected) (citing United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305
(1956)).
139. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)
(limitation on the number of franchises that could be sold within a given location
was not a per se violation of antitrust law and should be evaluated under the rule
of reason); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918)
(the test of the legality of an agreement or regulation is whether it is a reason-
able regulation of business consistent with the provisions of federal antitrust
law, rather than an agreement designed to suppress or destroy competition);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (Congress intended that
"the standard of reason" should guide the factfinder in determining which of all
conceivable restraints of trade were prohibited by the Sherman Act).
140. Continental T.V, 433 U.S. at 49.
141. For citations to cases in which the "rule of reason" standard is articu-
lated and applied, see supra note 139.
142. United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584, 588 (8th Cir. 1970) (cit-
ing Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964); Eliza-
beth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884
(1959); Spears Free Clinic v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952); Prospect
Dairy, Inc. v. Deliwood Dairy Co., 237 F. Supp. 176 (N.D.N.Y. 1964)). See also
Note, Collins v. Main Line Board of Realtors: "Open Door" Policy for Real Estate
Multiple Listing Services, 35 U. PIrr. L. REV. 323, 332 (1973).
143. See, e.g., Lieberthal v. North Carolina Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d
Cir. 1964) (antitrust action dismissed because defendant's activity was wholly
intrastate and did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, despite
defendant's procurement of supplies from out-of-state). For a discussion of
cases in which courts have refused to find a sufficient impact on interstate com-
merce to meet the jurisdictional requirements of federal antitrust law, see Katz &
Horwitz, supra note 3, at 11-12.
19851
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B. State Enforcement of Federal Law
While the scope of the federal antitrust laws is broad and
comprehensive, local and insular trade restraints are outside their
jurisdiction. 44 Without a state antitrust law, the Attorney Gen-
eral is powerless to sanction these activities.' 45 Although there is
a general perception that federal law is sufficient to protect the
interests of the state, 146 it is an erroneous perception. Because of
the interstate commerce requirement and other jurisdictional
prerequisites, 47 the Attorney General has only limited ability to
enforce the federal mandates.
One important tool used by the Attorney General to imple-
ment antitrust policy is a parens patriae suit.' 4 8 Under the parens
patriae doctrine, the state is said to represent all of its citizens
when it is a party to a suit in a matter relating to its interests as a
sovereign. 149 Under section four of the Clayton Act, which grants
"persons" injured by antitrust violations the right to sue for dam-
144. For a discussion of the interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement
of the federal antitrust laws, see supra notes 123 & 135-38 and accompanying
text.
145. For a discussion of the common law remedies available to the state
Attorney General and their inadequacy for redressing intrastate antitrust inju-
ries, see infra notes 178-99 and accompanying text.
146. Note, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement: The Problems with Putting New
Wine in Old Wine Skins, 4J. CORP. L. 547, 569-74 (1979) (discussing the "Myth of
Adequate Federal Enforcement" of antitrust violations).
147. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a (1982) (requiring private persons and
the United States, in suits for damages as a result of antitrust violations, to sue in
the "United States district court for the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent").
148. Literally translated, parens patriae means "parent of the country."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1978). It is a legal doctrine of standing
under which a government may bring suit to protect quasi-sovereign interests.
Id.
149. See generally Note, FederalJurisdiction-Suits by a State as Parens Patriae, 48
N.C.L. REV. 963 (1970) (discussing the requirements for a state to bring aparens
patriae suit).
The Supreme Court first applied the parens patriae doctrine in the antitrust
field in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). In that case, Georgia
charged that the railroad company conspired to fix prices and give preferences
to other localities, thereby injuring Georgia's economy. Id. at 443. The Court
upheld Georgia's parens patriae claim for injunctive relief because the alleged
misconduct of the defendant was a matter of "grave public concern in which
Georgia ha[d] an interest apart from that of particular individuals who may [have
been] affected." Id. at 451. For a detailed discussion of the use of parens patriae
actions in antitrust cases, see Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Inno-
vations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1971); Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the
Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 193 (1970).
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ages, the state is considered a person.150 Thus, if the Common-
wealth, as parens patriae, were injured by conduct which violated
the antitrust laws, it could bring suit in federal court.15'
Parens patriae actions are particularly well suited to redress
harm to consumers, who bear a significant portion of the injury
from illegal overcharges. 152 Prior to 1976, these actions were
limited to injunctive relief,' 53 a remedy which did little to benefit
consumers or deter unlawful conduct.' 54 Courts and commenta-
tors recognized the inadequacy of injunctive relief to redress inju-
ries suffered as a result of intrastate antitrust violations. 55 In
150. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 452 (1945); Ohio v.
United Transp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (S.D. Ohio 1981). Section 4 of
the Clayton Act provides that persons injured in their business or property as a
result of antitrust violations may bring suit in federal district court and recover
three times their actual damages and the cost of suit, including attorney's fees.
See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
151. See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R. FED. 878, 880-81 (1975) (exploring the
applicability of parens patriae suits to antitrust violations under the Clayton Act);
Note, supra note 149.
Although this discussion centers on federal parens suits under the Sherman
Act, it is important to note that Pennsylvania may bring an action as parens patriae
under state law as well. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Foster, 120 Pittsburgh Leg. J.
265 (1972) (a parens patriae suit under Pennsylvania's consumer protection laws
to enjoin unfair or deceptive trade practices). Of course, the practical utility of a
parens patriae suit under state law depends entirely upon the existence of a state
law that addresses the particular injury the government may seek to remedy.
For a discussion of antitrust protection in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 178-208
and accompanying text.
152. See Hill, The Present and Future Status of Parens Patriae Litigation from the
Plaintiff's Viewpoint, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1375, 1377 (1979) (legislative provisions
allowing states to recover damages in parens actions reflected legislative belief
that consumers suffered a significant portion of the damages caused by antitrust
violations). See also S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1976).
The cost of individual suits and class actions, as well as the procedural com-
plexity of class action litigation, render it practically impossible for many con-
sumers to recover damages suffered as a result of antitrust violations. There are
exacting requirements of numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of
representation involved in certifying a class for federal class action litigation. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. In addition, the Supreme Court has interpreted rule 23 to
require actual notice to all class members. See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 175 (1974). The cost of meeting these types of requirements renders
many potential consumer class actions prohibitively expensive. See Note, supra
note 146, at 599.
153. See Hill, supra note 152, at 1380. For examples of cases in which the
courts refused to grant damages to states suing in parens patriae, see California v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); In
re Multi-district Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1045 (1973).
154. See Hill, supra note 151, at 1380 (injunctive penalties provide violators
with no incentive to comply until a damage action is brought against them).
155. See, e.g., California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir.) (a
state class action on behalf of injured consumers in the antitrust context had
merit, but the legislature should fashion such a remedy), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
19851
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response to this inadequacy, Congress passed the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act in 1976.156 This measure
created comprehensive procedures which allowed state attorneys
general to recover damages in parens patriae actions for violations
of the Sherman Act.' 57 The new act also addressed an inherent
difficulty in consumer class action cases: proof of damages. The
new provisions required only that plaintiffs establish a violation of
the Sherman Act, an injury, and an approximate amount of
damage.' 58
Unfortunately for consumers and for the Commonwealth's
antitrust policy, the right of the Attorney General to bring parens
patriae cases was severely circumscribed shortly after its statutory
expansion. 159 In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,160 the United States
908 (1973); Comment, Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions for Treble Damages, 14 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 328 (1977) (evaluating the applicability and consequences of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act); Note, supra note 145, at 600.
156. Pub. L. No. 94-435, tit. III, § 3, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976) (codified at 15
U.S.C. 99 15c-15h (1982)). For a discussion of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, see
generally Hill, supra note 151; Maness, supra note 101, at 846-47.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1982). The Sherman Act provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of
such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in
such State, in any district court having jurisdiction of the defendant, to
secure monetary relief. . . for injury sustained by such natural persons
to their property by reason of [the Sherman Act].
Id. § 15c(a)(1).
158. Id. § 15d. Section 15d of this act provides, in pertinent part, that
damages may be proved and assessed in the aggregate by statistical or
sampling methods, by the computation of illegal overcharges, or by
such other reasonable system of estimating aggregate damages as the
court in its discretion may permit without the necessity of separately
proving the individual claim of, or amount of damage to, persons on
whose behalf the suit was brought.
Id.
159. Passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act sparked apprehension that state
attorneys general would abuse the new device, but the small number of parens
suits which were actually filed indicates that these fears were unwarranted. See
Maness, supra note 101, at 846-47. Between the time the legislation was enacted
in 1976 and 1981, Pennsylvania had filed only one parens suit, In re Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Distribs., Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md.), modified, 541 F. Supp. 62, 64
(D. Md. 1981). See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, 1982 ANTI-
TRUST QUESTIONNAIRE [hereinafter cited as 1982 NAAG QUESTIONNAIRE].
160. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). For commentary on the Illinois Brick decision, see
generally Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive
Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269 (1979); Landes & Posner, Should Indirect
Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the
Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1979); Note, Scaling the Illinois
Brick Wall. The Future of Indirect Purchasers in Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 309 (1978); Note, supra note 146, at 582-86; Note, Illinois Brick Rule Requires
Dismissal of Private Antitrust Action by Indirect Purchasers Despite Allegation of Injury as
[Vol. 30: p. 63
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss1/2
PENNSYLVANIA'S ANTIBID-RIGGING ACT
Supreme Court ruled that only purchasers who bought directly
from an alleged price fixer had standing under section four of the
Clayton Act to recover damages for such violations.' 6' All other
parties in the chain of distribution were without redress. Because
most injured parties, including the state, are indirect purchasers
who do not deal directly with the price fixer, the Court's decision
has the effect of removing a vast number of consumers from the
ambit of the statutory protection. 162 As a result of Illinois Brick,
the Commonwealth can bring parens patriae actions only on behalf
of direct purchasers.163
Direct Target of Anticompetitive Conspiracy, 29 VILL. L. REv. 801, 808-19 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Illinois Brick Rule].
161. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 (1977). In Illinois Brick,
the state of Illinois brought a civil action for damages against Illinois Brick Co.,
alleging that the company had conspired to fix the prices of its concrete block in
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 726-27. The state brought its suit on
behalf of some 700 local governmental agencies, who were allegedly injured by
illegal overcharges passed from Illinois Brick through the masonry and general
contractors to the governmental agencies who let the construction contracts. Id.
The Supreme Court found, however, that indirect purchasers who were harmed
through the "pass-on" of illegal overcharges did not have standing to bring anti-
trust damages actions under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 428-29.
"Pass-on" in this context refers to "the process whereby a businessman who
has been overcharged adjusts his own price upward to reflect the overcharge."
McQuire, The Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble
Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. PIrr. L. REV. 177, 181 (1971). In an offen-
sive pass-on situation, the plaintiff/indirect purchaser claims injury from
overcharges which were passed on to him through intermediate purchasers in
the chain of distribution. Shaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage
Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 884 (1975).
Defensive pass-on is an affirmative defense under which the defendant claims
that the plaintiff/direct purchaser suffered no recoverable damages as a result of
illegal overcharges because he was able to pass the overcharges on to his cus-
tomers/indirect purchasers. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (disallowing use of defensive pass-on in an antitrust
action).
The Supreme Court banned the use of defensive pass-on in Hanover Shoe
due to the difficulty of tracing overcharges. Id. at 493. This reasoning entered
into the Court's decision to bar likewise the use of offensive pass-on in Illinois
Brick. 431 U.S. at 741-45. The Illinois Brick court also expressed concern over
the possibility of multiple liability for defendants if a defensive pass-on were
prohibited while an offensive pass-on were allowed. Id. at 730-31.
Finally, the Court observed that denying recovery to indirect purchasers
would not diminish the policy of encouraging private enforcement of antitrust
laws because indirect purchasers would usually have such a small stake in any
suit for damages that few would ever come forward to make a claim for their
damages. Id. at 746-47.
162. See Note, supra note 146, at 584-86.
163. Id. at 585. The Supreme Court has recognized two limited exceptions
to the general rule that indirect purchasers may not recover. The general rule
will not apply in the case of a preexisting cost-plus contract under which the
buyer bears the risk of increases in the seller's cost of production. 431 U.S. at
735-36. See Note, Illinois Brick Rule, supra note 160, at 810-11. Nor will the gen-
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To overcome the effects of Illinois Brick, some states have en-
acted legislation which authorizes suits for indirect purchasers
under state law. 164 However, no such legislation, which effec-
tively supersedes Illinois Brick, has been offered in Penn-
sylvania.' 65 At the federal level, legislative attempts to override
Illinois Brick have been unsuccessful. 166
One administrative approach for circumventing Illinois Brick
is to insert an assignment of claims clause in state purchasing con-
tracts. 16 7 Under such a clause, a vendor who sells goods or serv-
ices to the Commonwealth assigns its rights to the
Commonwealth for any subsequent cause of action arising out of
the contract. 68 Thus, if the vendor could have sued its supplier
for antitrust violations, this right of action accrues to the Com-
monwealth. The use of assignment clauses in the antitrust arena
has been upheld by several courts. 16 9
eral rule apply in situations where indirect purchasers buy from direct purchas-
ers who are owned or controlled by the defendant antitrust violator. 431 U.S. at
736 n.16. See Note, Illinois Brick Rule, supra note 160, at 811-12. In both of these
situations, the effect of the defendant's overcharge is direct, traceable, predeter-
mined and unaffected by outside forces in the market. Id. at 736.
164. For examples of state statutes which grant a cause of action to indirect
purchasers, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (West 1964 & Supp. 1984);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-14 (1976 & Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7
(Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1984), MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-202 (1983).
Federal courts have upheld a state's right to proceed in state court as an indirect
purchaser under an Illinois Brick repealer statute. See, e.g., In re Sugar Antitrust
Litig., 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979). See gener-
ally Cavanagh, The Illinois Brick Dilemma: Is there a Legislative Solution?, 48 ALB. L.
REv. 273 (1984).
165. One of the comprehensive antitrust proposals introduced in the Penn-
sylvania legislature was drafted with the specific intent not to overrule Illinois
Brick. See Memorandum from Attorney General Edward G. Biester, Jr., for Gen-
eral Distribution (Oct. 17, 1979) (analyzing the proposed H.R. 1594, 163d Pa.
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)).
166. In 1978, federal legislation to override Illinois Brick was introduced and
reported out of both the House and SenateJudiciary Committees, but no further
action was taken. See Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3, at 9 & n.55. In the 95th, 96th
and 97th Congresses, bills to this effect were introduced but not enacted. See
Kirk, An Overview of the Delaware Antitrust Act, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 243, 248 n.39
(1983). A measure introduced in the 98th Congress was still pending as of pub-
lication. See id.
167. See Maness, supra note 101, at 829. As of 1981, eighteen states report-
edly included assignment of claims provisions in their standard purchasing con-
tracts. 1982 NAAG QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 159.
168. For examples of the construction of such clauses in the courts, see
infra note 169.
169. See, e.g., D'Ippolitio v. Cities Serv. Co., 374 F.2d 643, 647 (2d Cir.
1967) (antitrust claims of members of gasoline business partnership were assign-
able); Hicks v. Beacon Moving & Storage Co., 87 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1937)
(antitrust claim survives the death of the injured party and is assignable); Mercu-
Ray Indus. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 392 F. Supp. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y.) (corporate anti-
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After Illinois Brick was decided, the Pennsylvania Department
of General Services reprinted its invitation-to-bid forms. 170 The
reverse side of the bid form contains terms and conditions, in-
cluding an assignment clause for price fixing claims. 171 These
clauses are now part of all purchasing contracts in Pennsylvania.
They are not found, however, in construction contracts let by
General Services. Therefore, Pennsylvania has not yet fully over-
come the indirect purchaser limitation of Illinois Brick.
In summary, although parens patiae suits remain legally via-
ble, as a practical matter they are of limited use. But at least with
regard to state purchases, the assignment clauses combined with
Pennsylvania's new antibid-rigging statute will enable the Com-
monwealth to recover most of the damages it incurs. The major-
ity of cases of price fixing or collusion, however, are unrelated to
state purchasing. In these cases, Pennsylvanians continue to be
without a remedy.
In addition to parens patriae suits, the state may seek injunctive
relief and damages in its proprietary capacity.172 This action, like
most parens patriae cases, arises under the Clayton Act. 173 A pro-
prietary action is brought when the state is a consumer of goods
or services. 174 Such actions are particularly important to the
Commonwealth given the volume of its annual purchases. 75
trust claims were assignable to individual plaintiff), aff'd mem., 508 F.2d 837 (2d
Cir. 1974).
170. See Bureau of Purchases, Pennsylvania Department of General Serv-
ices, Invitation-Bid Proposal (GSPUR-I IA) (rev. June, 1978).
171. See id. 9. Subsequently, in 1983, an additional assignment clause was
included on the front side of the bid sheet. See Bureau of Purchases, Penn-
sylvania Department of General Services, Invitation-Bid Proposal (GSPUR-10)
(rev. Oct., 1983). This provision is virtually identical to the language in Wash-
ington's assignment clause, which the Third Circuit implicitly held to be valid in
In re Fine Paper Litig., 632 F.2d 1081, 1090 (3d Cir. 1980).
172. "Proprietary capacity" describes the functions of a governmental unit
engaged in a business-like venture, as contrasted with a governmental function.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1097 (5th ed. 1979).
173. See Comment, Parens Patriae Suits-Damages to a State's Economy Not Com-
pensable Under the Clayton Act, 18 N.Y.L.F. 465, 466 (1972). Section 16 of the
Clayton Act provides that a person threatened with loss or damage as a result of
antitrust violations may seek injunctive relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982). For a
discussion of the damage provisions of the Clayton Act and their applicability to
state governments, see supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
174. The legislative history of the Clayton Act indicates that Congress in-
tended that state governments be able to recover for injuries suffered in their
capacity as consumers of goods and services. See Comment, supra note 173, at
467.
175. In 1973, the fifty states and their political subdivisions spent more
than $75 billion for goods and services. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
STATE AND LOCAL PURCHASING 11 (1975). By 1980, this figure had increased to
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Thus, if the state buys paper or tires from parties who fixed prices
or restrained trade, there is a cause of action under federal law.1 76
Finally, a proprietary suit may also be brought as a class action,
wherein the Commonwealth designates itself as class representa-
tive. In this instance it would usually represent municipalities or
political subdivisions who have suffered a similar injury. 177
C. Common Law Protections
Common law prohibitions against unreasonable restraints of
trade were the only form of antitrust protection at the state level
for many years.' 78 Although the common law developed to pro-
hibit restrictive convenants and price fixing agreements, 179 it was
inadequate to protect the public from unfair trade practices.' 80
As a result, many states enacted antitrust laws even before the
$300 billion. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE AND LOCAL PURCHASING
12 (2d ed. 1983). In 1983, the Department of General Services awarded con-
struction and procurement contracts for over $359 million. Memorandum from
Joe Kurylak, Department of General Services, to Ellen Kandell (Feb. 28, 1984).
For fiscal year 1982-83, the Department of Transportation awarded $300.2 mil-
lion in contracts for highway maintenance and improvement and bridge con-
struction. Memorandum from John Hohenwarter, Director, Office of Legislative
Affairs, Department of Transportation, to Ellen Kandell (Mar. 13, 1984). The
department budgeted $800 million for 1983-84, although only $322.8 million
had been awarded in the first seven months of that fiscal year. Id.
176. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Litig., 632 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) (Penn-
sylvania is a party in its proprietary capacity as a purchaser of paper from
defendants).
177. See, e.g., id. (dual state class action); In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 76
F.R.D. 460 (D. Conn. 1977), affld mem., 580 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1978) (multidis-
trict class action). See also In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig.,
83 F.R.D. 305 (D. Md. 1979) (four private class actions and a state parens patriae
class action brought on behalf of natural persons within the state of Maryland
who sold real estate through the defendants).
178. For a discussion of the common law development of antitrust law, see
generally Adler, Monopolizing at Common Law and Under Section Two of the Sherman
Act, 31 HARV. L. REV. 246 (1917); Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust
Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759 (1955); Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3, at 1-3. American
common law antitrust protections are rooted in English common law prohibi-
tions against unreasonable restraints of trade. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Reynolds, 24
Eng. Rep. 347 (1711) (analyzing the enforceability of a promise to refrain from
trade as a baker in a particular region).
179. See, e.g., Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467 (1866) (restrictive covenant not
to compete for the defendant's lifetime declared void); Central Oil Salt Co. v.
Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880) (enforcement of price fixing arrangement
denied).
180. See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 50-53 (1954). Because the common law is a body of tradi-
tion which has developed over a long period of time to apply to many similar
situations, it is not surprising that common law policies in the specific and dis-
tinct area of antitrust regulation are weak. Id. See also Limbaugh, Historic Origins
of Anti-Trust Legislation, 18 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1953).
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federal government took action.' 8 '
In the absence of statutory antitrust law, it would seem that
Pennsylvania's common law might have expanded to fill the re-
sulting vacuum. Unfortunately, this has not happened. 82 The
foundation of Pennsylvania common law in this area is the prohi-
bition against contracts in restraint of trade.' 83 The common law
remedy holds such contracts void and unenforceable. 84 In 1940,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court added the remedy of injunctive
relief.' 85 Since then, however, there has been no substantial de-
velopment of common law protection.
In determining whether specific acts and practices fall within
the common law prohibition, Pennsylvania courts have been
guided by decisions interpreting the Sherman Act. 18 6 Commer-
cial boycotts,' 8 7 horizontal and vertical price fixing,18 8 and unrea-
181. Twenty-one states had antitrust statutes before the enactment of the
Sherman Act in 1890. Note, The Present Revival and Future Course of State Antitrust
Enforcement, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 575 n.2 (1963).
182. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's common law regulation of restric-
tive trade practices, see generally Comment, supra note 3, at 732-48.
183. For an early example of the common law principles governing con-
tracts in restraint of trade, see Nester v. Continental Brewing Co., 161 Pa. 473,
29 A. 102 (1894) (refusing to enforce a price fixing agreement and noting that
the test was not the scope, form or purpose of the restraint, but whether it was
injurious to the public interest).
184. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Lenhart, 182 Pa. 285, 37 A. 811 (1897) (covenant
not to compete held unenforceable for lack of consideration).
185. See Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers' Union, 339 Pa. 353,
14 A.2d 438 (1940) (enjoining operation of union contract provisions which ex-
cluded private businessmen from the laundry industry).
186. See, e.g., Collins v. Main Line Bd. of Realtors, 452 Pa. 342, 349, 304
A.2d 493, 496, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). In Collins, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court relied on federal cases decided under the Sherman Act to adju-
dicate a state common law claim that a real estate multiple listing service exclu-
sively for members of a nonprofit corporation constituted an unreasonable, and
therefore unlawful, restraint of trade. Id. at 349-50, 304 A.2d at 496. The court
explained its reliance on federal cases by characterizing the Sherman Act as
"merely the application of the common law doctrine concerning the restraint of
trade to the field of interstate commerce." Id. at 349, 304 A.2d at 496 (quoting
Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers Union, 339 Pa. 353, 359, 14 A.2d
438, 441 (1940)).
187. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (en-
joining members of a press association from blocking news service to nonmem-
bers); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (enjoining
manufacturers from refusing to sell to other manufacturers and retailers). For a
discussion of cases involving commercial boycotts, see Note, supra note 142, at
326-28.
188. See, e.g., Nester v. Continental Brewing Co., 161 Pa. 473, 29 A. 102
(1894) (invalidating an agreement among brewers to fix prices of their products
purely for the purpose of eliminating competition); Morris Run Coal Co. v. Bar-
clay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871) (invalidating contract which compelled coal
mining companies to fix the prices of their products).
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sonable restrictive covenants 89 fall within the common law
prohibition of restraints of trade. Exclusive dealing contracts,
barred under federal antitrust statutes, 90 are similarly prohibited
at common law upon a showing of injury to the public. 19' Yet
other trade practices which plainly violate federal statutes are not
necessarily illegal under state common law. These include tying
arrangements, 192 monopolization, 93 price discrimination 194 and
189. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Funds Corp. v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 8, 159 A.2d
472, 476 (1960) (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 516(f) (1932) (current
version at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186-188 (1979))). For a
discussion of enforcement of restrictive covenants under Pennsylvania law, see
Comment, supra note 3, at 738-39.
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (contracts in restraint of trade are unlawful);
id. § 14 (1982) (contracts that are conditional upon the contracting party's not
using goods of a competitor are unlawful).
191. For a discussion of exclusive dealing contracts under Pennsylvania
law, see Comment, supra note 3, at 741-42 (Pennsylvania law is unclear, but
there are a few cases which do exist upholding exclusive dealing contracts).
192. The Supreme Court defines a tying arrangement as "an agreement by
a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also
purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not
purchase the product from any other supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Tying arrangements have been held to be per se
violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See, e.g., Standard Oil
Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). However, the legal effect of tying arrange-
ments under Pennsylvania law is uncertain. See Comment, supra note 3, at 740-
41.
193. Under federal law, monopolization, attempts to monopolize and com-
binations or conspiracies to monopolize any part of interstate trade or com-
merce violate § 2 of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Pennsylvania
cases, however, do not paint a clear picture of exactly what conduct is prohib-
ited. See Comment, supra note 3, at 743-46. The cases generally reflect an "ab-
horrence of anticompetitive monopolistic behavior . . . [and] promotion of a
free market policy in Pennsylvania." Id. at 746. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Laundry &
Linen Supply Drivers' Union, 339 Pa. 353, 362, 14 A.2d 438, 442 (1940) (invali-
dating a labor contract for various restraints of trade, including the "common-
law prohibition of monopolies"); Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68
Pa. 173 (1871) (monopolistic practices which destroy competition are illegal and
void). But see Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. Stanton, 227 Pa. 55, 75 A.
988 (1910) (a buy-sell agreement which gave one firm 60-70% of the total brick
manufacturing market is not an illegal restraint of trade); Monongahela River
Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Jutte, 210 Pa. 288, 59 A. 1088 (1904) (refusing to
invalidate a restrictive covenant in a contract between plaintiff, who had monop-
oly on coal production and shipping, and defendant, who was to mine and ship
coal exclusively for plaintiff).
194. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(b), 21(a) (1982). Price discrimination, however, is a statutory
offense. Since Pennsylvania has no statutory prohibition against price discrimi-
nation, it appears that there is no protection against such activity at the state
level. See Comment, supra note 3, at 746-47. Courts have been unwilling to ex-
pand the common law in Pennsylvania to prohibit price discrimination. Id.
Predatory pricing has been held unlawful by some Pennsylvania courts. Id. (cit-
ing Gillette Co. v. Master, 408 Pa. 202, 182 A.2d 734 (1962)). It also violates the
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some forms of mergers. 195 As to forms of relief, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has fashioned no new remedies or sanctions for
conduct violating antitrust principles;' 96 nor has it developed fur-
ther procedural safeguards.19
7
In short, the Pennsylvania judiciary has provided little clear
guidance on the parameters of a judicially created remedy for an-
titrust violations. 198 Nor has it enunciated any broad substantive
prohibitions, sanctions or penalties. 199 It seems unlikely, there-
fore, that any "little Sherman Act" will be fashioned to afford the
Commonwealth's citizens viable redress for antitrust-related inju-
ries in the near future.
D. Related State Statutes
Unfortunately, Pennsylvania's related state statutes do little
to supplement the meager common law protection. The most di-
rectly relevant Pennsylvania statute is the Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Act. 20 0 Modeled after the Federal
Pennsylvania Unfair Sales Act, which prohibits sales below cost when the seller's
intent is to injure competition. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 213 (Purdon 1971).
195. Under federal law, mergers are carefully scrutinized for possible
anticompetitive effects under § 7 of the Clayton Act and under the Sherman
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (prohibiting acquisition by one corporation of the
stock of another where the effect of the acquisition is to substantially lessen com-
petition or to tend to create a monopoly). Pennsylvania law, however, autho-
rizes mergers without any statutory restrictions on possible antitrust violations.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1901 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1984-85) (permitting
the merger of any two or more business corporations).
196. Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3, at 10-11.
197. Id. at 11.
198. One might argue, from its application of federal antitrust principles in
Collins, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was on the track of creating a com-
mon law "little Sherman Act." See Note, supra note 142, at 332-34 (state anti-
trust statutes are frequently labeled "Little Sherman Acts"). The Collins case,
involving the issue of restraint of trade in intrastate commerce, seemed to indi-
cate that a party could bring an antitrust suit under state common law, with fed-
eral Sherman Act decisions serving as precedent.
The Collins court granted equitable relief, but found no basis in the record
to award damages. 452 Pa. at 352, 304 A.2d at 498. One commentator has
argued that the Collins court left open the possibility of awarding compensatory
damages when they could be determined to a reasonable degree of certainty. See
Note, supra note 142, at 333-34. But see Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A
Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV.
375, 431 & n.214 (1974) (questioning the Collins court's position that the com-
mon law embraces Sherman Act principles and maintaining that state law might
not have developed along the lines of the common law without the impetus pro-
vided by federal statutes and decisions). For further discussion of the Collins
decision, see supra note 186.
199. See Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3, at 10-11.
200. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-1 to -9.2. (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1984-
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Trade Commission Act, 20 1 this law is of limited scope, prohibiting
only unfair and deceptive practices. 20 2 It protects consumers and
corporations 20 3 from fraudulent and misleading practices in trade
or commerce.20 4 Despite its extensive list of prohibited prac-
tices,20 5 this act has only limited effectiveness in punishing a vast
array of business practices which may injure competition. 20 6
No clear policy or guidance can be garnered from existing
state statutes with respect to the regulation of competition and
unfair trade practices. 20 7 Moreover, after a thorough review of
201. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982). For a discussion of the provisions of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, see supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
202. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-2(4), 201-3 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1984-
85). The Act defines unfair and deceptive practice to include passing off goods
or services as those of another, causing confusion as to the source of goods or
services or their association with another, representing goods to be of a certain
age, geographic origin, quality, standard or style when they are of another, and
false advertising.
203. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(2) (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1984-85) (in
defining who is protected by the Act, the statute provides that the term "person"
includes natural persons, corporations, and any other legal entity). Although
the Act's definition of protected persons is a broad one, the provisions of the
statute indicate that its primary thrust is consumer protection. See, e.g., id. § 201-
7 (concerning recission of door-to-door sales contracts).
204. See id §§ 201-3 to -4, -8 to -9. The Act provides for both public and
private enforcement. Id. § 201-3. The Attorney General may seek a permanent
or temporary injunction. Id. § 201-4. If the terms of an injunction or assurance
of voluntary compliance are violated, the wrongdoer incurs a civil penalty. Id.
§ 201-8. Courts also have the discretion to order restitution. Id. § 201-4.1. In
addition, if a person has suffered ascertainable damages as a result of conduct in
violation of the Act, he may bring a private action for damages and may be
awarded punitive damages. Id. §§ 201-8, -9.2.
205. See supra note 202.
206. Other statutes protecting consumers are too limited in scope to pro-
vide any significant supplement to the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act. See, e.g., Gasoline, Petroleum Products and Motor Vehicle Ac-
cessories Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 202-1 to -8 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85);
Feature Motion Picture Fair Business Practices Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§ 203-1 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
There are Pennsylvania statutes which regulate certain industries, but
neither the focus nor the effect of these laws is on consumer protection. See, e.g.,
Banking Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 101-2204 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1984-
85); Milk Marketing Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 511-683 (Purdon 1958 &
Supp. 1984); Insurance Department Law of 1921, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1-
321 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1984-85); Insurance Company Act of 1921, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, §§ 341-1010 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1984-85); Liquor Code, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1984-85).
207. One commentator, upon review of the banking, liquor, milk marketing
and public utility statutes and case law in Pennsylvania, concluded that the state
legislature had failed to articulate an overall policy balancing regulation of com-
petition with the promotion of economic well-being and public protection. See
Comment, supra note 3, at 749-58. It should be pointed out, however, that the
purpose of the banking and milk marketing statutes is, for reasons of public
policy, to eliminate competition in those areas. See id. at 751, 757-58.
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the common law on restrictive trade practices, one can only agree
with a recent commentator's observation that Pennsylvania's pol-
icy on competition, if it exists at all, is weak and imprecise.20 8
The absence of strong common law protections, the lack of judi-
cially fashioned guidelines, and an inadequate statutory scheme
leave Pennsylvania with only meager antitrust protection.
IV. THE IMPACT OF PENNSYLVANIA'S ANTIBID-RIGGING ACT
Restraints of trade and conspiracies within the boundaries of
the Commonwealth are not prohibited by the- federal govern-
ment. 209 These purely local, intrastate violations must be ad-
dressed at the state level. 2 10 Thus, the need for state antitrust
enforcement is patent. Commentators have lamented Penn-
sylvania's failure to address this problem, 2 1 but the policymakers
and judiciary have remained silent. Given the fiscal impact of an-
titrust conduct, 212 the magnitude of the harm, 21 3 and the serious-
ness of the offense, 21 4 the absence of a state antitrust law is
208. See id. at 748.
209. For a discussion of the federal jurisdictional requirement of interstate
commerce, see supra notes 122 & 135-38 and accompanying text.
210. Some commentators have suggested that responsibility for antitrust
enforcement should actually rest with district attorneys at the local level, instead
of, or in addition to, the jurisdiction of the Attorney General. See, e.g., Fellmeth,
supra note 95, at 2-4; Note, supra note 146, at 579.
211. See Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3, at 1, 10-11, 17-18, 30; Comment,
supra note 3; Note, supra note 142, at 332-34.
212. There are varying estimates on the economic impact of antitrust con-
duct. See, e.g., Fellmeth, supra note 95, at 8 (estimating cost to public of antitrust
violations to be near $40 billion) (citing M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE
SYSTEM (1972)); Note, supra note 146, at 584 (discussing the impact of Illinois
Brick on governmental purchasers and estimating that the federal government
could lose nearly $205 million in recoveries and state governments could lose as
much as $500 million). At least one commentator has observed that the benefits
of antitrust prosecutions far exceed benefits of prosecution of other crimes be-
cause of the widespread economic effect of restraints of trades. See Fellmeth,
supra note 95, at 8-11. For further discussion of the cost of trade restraints, see
generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 122, at 268-71; K. ELZINGA & W.
BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 5-6 (1976).
213. The number of victims of any given antitrust violation is often difficult,
if not impossible, to ascertain and may well exceed the federal procedural re-
quirement that a class action be manageable. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v.
American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72-73 (D.N.J. 1971) (class of all persons who
had purchased gasoline from retail outlets over a ten-year period in three states
was too large to be manageable within the requirements of rule 23(b)(3)(D)).
214. Since 1974, antitrust violations have been classified as felonies with
fines of up to one million dollars, and maximum jail sentences of three years.
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startling. In this setting, the Antibid-Rigging Act is especially
significant.
When the Act made its way through the General Assembly,
its prime sponsor, Senator Reibman, judiciously avoided any
analogy to antitrust laws because of the bleak legislative history
on this issue in Pennsylvania. 21 5 In fact, the word "antitrust" was
not used in any speeches or press releases until the bill was
passed. Yet the Act is clearly an antitrust measure.21 6 In order to
predict its impact on the future of Pennsylvania antitrust law, it is
essential to understand how this Act fits into the general scheme
of antitrust regulation. This section examines the kinds of anti-
trust activity which the bid-rigging statute may be interpreted to
prohibit.
A single reading of the definitional section reveals that this
Act is a relatively strong antitrust measure within its limited
scope. 2 17 Although it prohibits several direct restraints of trade, it
is primarily a price-fixing statute. Bid-rigging, by definition, is a
type of price fixing by which two or more parties determine in
advance who will be the winning bidder on a competitively let
contract. To be precise, this conduct is horizontal price fixing.2 1 8
The term bid-rigging, as defined in the Act, includes at least
two additional practices which restrain trade. One of these is a
215. For a discussion of the legislative history of previous antitrust bills, see
infra notes 241 & 256-60 and accompanying text.
216. For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the Act, see supra notes
29-121 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the antitrust protection af-
forded by the Act, see infra notes 217-40 and accompanying text.
217. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1612 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). For a de-
tailed discussion of the definitional sections of the Act, see supra notes 32-39 and
accompanying text. The federal price fixing statute is the Robinson Patman An-
tidiscrimination Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(b), 21(a) (1982).
By way of comparison, North Carolina enacted a comprehensive price-fixing
statute in 1961, some twenty years before the adoption of its bid-rigging statute.
Aycock, supra note 30, at 209 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(7) (1981)). This
price-fixing statute represented North Carolina's first statutory effort to outlaw
bid-rigging in the form of identical bids being received by the state's Division of
Purchase and Contract. Id. North Carolina's price-fixing laws are "underdevel-
oped statutes" compared to the federal antitrust statutes. Id. at 227.
218. Briefly defined, horizontal price fixing is an agreement among sellers
or buyers to join together and establish a price for their goods or services, rather
than to compete with one another. Aycock, supra note 30, at 224. This is to be
distinguished from vertical price fixing, in which a manufacturer or producer
and a distributor agree to set resale prices in the chain of distribution. Id. Verti-
cal price fixing is commonly called resale price maintenance. Id. at 229. Resale
price agreements were unquestionably legal in Pennsylvania until the Fair Trade
laws were repealed in 1975 and 1976. Comment, supra note 3, at 736-37. See,
e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 7 (Purdon 1971) (repealed 1976).
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territorial arrangement. 21 9 A territorial arrangement may be hor-
izontal, whereby competitors agree to divide markets into geo-
graphic territory or product category, or to allocate customers. 220
The effect of a horizontal territorial arrangement is to completely
eliminate competition among the parties. 22' Horizontal arrange-
ments are, therefore, per se violations of federal law.
2 22
Territorial arrangements may also be accomplished verti-
cally, as when a seller and buyer assign territories to particular
parties and agree not to buy or sell in a territory assigned to an-
other.223 In contrast to horizontal arrangements, vertical market
division is not per se unreasonable under federal law.2 24 A seller
is often free to select his customers and to refuse to deal with
others, 225 so long as he harbors no illegal purpose or intent to
monopolize. 226 The Act prohibits those territorial arrangements,
horizontal or vertical, which are set up to "restrict
competition. " 2 2 7
The second anticompetitive practice encompassed by the
definition of bid-rigging is a refusal to deal. 228 Like vertical re-
straints, an individual refusal to deal is not prohibited by federal
antitrust laws, unless coupled with the intent to destroy or injure
a competitor's business. 229 Moreover, a sale conditioned on the
buyer's promise not to deal with a competitor is prohibited
"when the effect of the arrangement may be to substantially
219. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1612 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
220. Aycock, supra note 30, at 234.
221. Id. at 236.
222. For a discussion of the per se violation of federal antitrust statutes, see
supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
223. Aycock, supra note 30, at 234.
224. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(applying a rule of reason in nonprice vertical restraints, location restrictions on
the sale of a manufacturer's product are reasonable and valid when supported by
a legitimate business purpose).
225. Aycock, supra note 30, at 327.
226. Id. at 237, 239. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186-
188 (1979) (describing when a restraint of trade may be declared unreasonable).
227. Because the statute expressly prohibits territorial arrangements set up
"to restrict competition," it is not clear whether horizontal arrangements will be
deemed per se violations, as they are under federal law, or whether the state, in
order to prevail, will have to show an anticompetitive purpose in the case of both
horizontal and vertical agreements.
228. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1612 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (bid-rigging
includes agreeing not to submit bids).
229. Aycock, supra note 30, at 245. See also 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982) (agree-
ments not to use another's goods or services are not illegal unless the effect of
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lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce." 230 In the context of bid-rigging, if two or more per-
sons were to agree not to submit bids on a contract or subcon-
tract and such agreement were accompanied by an intent to
restrain trade,23' it would probably be considered an illegal re-
fusal to deal.
Although the Act does not mirror the fundamental antitrust
prohibitions of the Sherman Act,23 2 it does prohibit some of the
conduct which is contrary to the policy of the federal statute.233 A
combination or conspiracy which restrains trade in the area of
governmental purchasing is unlawful under the Act. 2 34 Price-fix-
ing, which is conclusively presumed to be an unreasonable re-
straint of trade under federal law, 23 5 would also violate
Pennsylvania law under this new statute.23 6 Territorial arrange-
ments which restrict competition and agreements not to submit
bids, both of which would violate federal law in some cases,
237
violate the Act as well.
2 38
230. Aycock, supra note 30, at 246.
231. With respect to the requirement that an agreement not to submit a bid
be accompanied by an intent to lessen competition or have the effect of re-
straining trade, it is significant that the Pennsylvania Act contains no such ex-
press requirement. For the text of the Pennsylvania provision, see supra note 33.
The language of the statute simply prohibits "[a]greeing not to submit bids."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1612 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). Proof of intent to injure
competition or restrain trade is a critical element of a cause of action under the
Act. A specific intent is required under § 2 of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1982). In the absence of express guidelines, the Commonwealth should be
guided by federal law in establishing the particular elements of a bid-rigging
offense.
232. For a discussion of the provisions of the Sherman Act, see supra notes
127-30 and accompanying text.
233. For examples of articulations of the federal antitrust policy, see Mul-
vey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 923 (1971) ("The antitrust laws are an expression of federal public
policy to foster free competition."); Aycock, supra note 30, at 228 (citing United
States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956)) (summarizing
federal policy on horizontal price fixing as contrary to the Sherman Act's goal of
fostering competition).
234. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1613(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (it is unlaw-
ful to conspire, collude or combine with another to commit or attempt to com-
mit bid-rigging involving a contract let by a governmental agency, or any
subcontract with a prime contractor for a governmental agency).
235. For a discussion of the per se unreasonableness of price fixing under
federal law, see supra note 136.
236. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1612 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
237. For a discussion of territorial arrangements under federal law, see
supra note 136 and accompanying text. For a discussion of refusals to deal under
federal law, see supra note 229 and accompanying text.
238. See PA. STAT. ANN. § 1612 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
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It is important to state what the Act is not. It is not a bar
against monopolization, mergers, tying arrangements or price
discrimination. 239 Nor is it a "little Sherman Act." Finally, unlike
some antitrust statutes, it does not contain a litany of unfair or
deceptive trade practices. 240
V. PENNSYLVANIA'S ANTITRUST VACUUM-AN EXPLANATION
In the past ten years, several antitrust proposals have been
introduced in the General Assembly. 24' Had there been signifi-
239. Federal sanctions against monopolization are found in § 2 of the Sher-
man Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). For a general discussion of price discrimina-
tion and mergers under federal antitrust law, see Aycock, supra note 30, at 233-
34, 253.
240. For an example of a more extensive state antitrust scheme, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-5 (1981) (listing a large number of prohibited trade practices).
241. In 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated The Uniform State Antitrust Act. UNIF. STATE ANTITRUST
ACT, 7A U.L.A. 733 (1973). This act was introduced in the General Assembly in
1975 as S. 216, 159th Pa. Cong. (1975). Kirkpatrick, State's Own Antitrust Laws
Considered by Legislature, Harrisburg Evening News, April 21, 1975. This measure
was released to the Senate floor by the Business and Commerce Committee in
April of 1975. Id. On June 2, 1975, the bill was referred to the Judiciary Com-
mittee. 1975 Pa. Legis. J. 342 (June 2, 1975). This same measure was reintro-
duced as S. 681, 161st Pa. Cong. (1977). 1977 Pa. Legis. J. 202 (March 30,
1977). It was referred to the Business and Commerce Committee at that point
in time and there is no record of further action on the bill. See id.
Also in 1973, the former Pennsylvania Department of Justice began to de-
velop its own antitrust proposal, derived from the National Association of Attor-
neys General's critique of the Uniform State Antitrust Act and from a review of
existing state laws. Trinkle, Pennsylvania Antitrust Law: A Review of the Pres-
ent-A Look at the Future 11-12 (June 1975) (unpublished manuscript). This
was introduced in the General Assembly in 1975 as S. 369, 159th Pa. Cong.
(1975). 1975 Pa. Legis. J. 139 (Feb. 25, 1975). The bill was committed to the
Business and Commerce Committee and there is no record of further action
taken on it. See id. For a general discussion of this proposal, see Letter from
Gerry J. Elman, Deputy Attorney General, to David Berger, Esq. (April 24,
1973); Memorandum from GerryJ. Elman, Deputy Attorney General, to Ronald
G. Lench, Governor's Special Assistant for Legislation (April 18, 1974). It is
interesting to note that this particular proposal was offered as a model antitrust
act by the National Association of Attorneys General. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF
ATrORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE
ANTITRUST LAWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT app. (Oct. 1974).
In the 1977-78 session of the General Assembly, two antitrust bills were
introduced. See H. 845, 161st Pa. Cong. (1977); S. 681, 161st Pa. Cong. (1977).
S. 681 is discussed supra. H. 845 was introduced on March 30, 1977 and re-
ferred to the Consumer Affairs Committee. 1977 Pa. Legis. J. 502 (Mar. 30,
1977). H. 845 saw the greatest legislative action of any recent antitrust propo-
sal; it received two readings in the House before it was tabled on third consider-
ation. See 1978 Pa. Legis. J. 314 (Mar. 13, 1978) (reported, first consideration,
and tabled); 1978 Pa. Legis.J. 321 (Mar. 14, 1978) (second consideration); 1978
Pa. Legis. J. 933 (Apr. 10, 1978) (passed over on third consideration); 1978 Pa.
Legis. J. 1558 (May 31, 1978) (tabled on third consideration). For a discussion
of the two legislative proposals of 1977-78, see Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3, at
1985]
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cant debate on any of these measures, it might have proven useful
to analyze and compare them. Since no such debate has oc-
curred, the relevant issue is not the merits of any particular bill.
Rather, it is the broader issue of why Pennsylvania is the only
state in the nation without an antitrust statute.242 The purpose of
this section is to offer possible reasons for this state of affairs.
At the outset, it is important to establish the role of the states
in antitrust enforcement. As previously noted, the first antitrust
statutes were enacted in the states.243 Then, in 1890, the Sher-
man Act was passed. 244 The legislative history demonstrates that
Congress clearly intended that the states continue to enforce
their antitrust laws. 24 5 State enforcement was meant to comple-
ment federal efforts.2 46 Expressions of congressional intent, how-
ever, are not mandates. The mere fact that antitrust laws were
21-30. For a discussion of the latest antitrust proposal to be introduced in the
General Assembly, see infra note 258.
242. See generally Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3; Comment, supra note 3;
Note, supra note 140, at 332-34. These commentators criticize Pennsylvania's
lack of antitrust legislation, but do not offer any explanation for this statutory
void.
243. Legislative history of the federal antitrust laws indicates that federal
action was a response to the perceived limitations in state law remedies, not
because of an absence of state antitrust law. See 21 CONG. REC. 2456, 2460(1890). In addressing the Senate on the issue of the need for federal antitrust
law, Senator Sherman observed:
Each State can and does prevent and control combinations within the
limit of the State. This we do not propose to interfere with. The power
of the State courts has been repeatedly exercised to set aside such com-
binations as I shall hereafter show, but these courts are limited in their
jurisdiction to the State, and, in our complex system of government,
are admitted to be unable to deal with the great evil that now threatens
us. . . . Each State can deal with a combination within the State, but
only the General Government can deal with combinations reaching not
only the several States, but the commercial world. This bill does not
include combinations within a State.
Id.
244. For a discussion of the provisions of the Sherman Act, see supra notes
127-30 and accompanying text.
245. In addressing the Senate as to the role federal antitrust legislation
would play in the overall scheme of antitrust enforcement, Senator Sherman in-
dicated that its purpose was to
supplement the enforcement of the established rules of common and
statute law by the courts of the several states in dealing with combina-
tions that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the citizens of those
states. It is to arm the federal courts within the limits of their constitu-
tional power that they may cooperate with the state courts in checking,
curbing and controlling the most dangerous combinations that now
threaten the business, property and trade of the people of the United
States.
21 CONG. REC: 2456, 2457 (1890).
246. See Note, supra note 146, at 557-58.
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enacted early in the nation's history does not necessarily indicate
that outlawing trade restraints was a priority for state officials.2 47
Indeed, state enforcement activity until the early 1970's had been
fairly minimal. 248
In Pennsylvania, the absence of a state antitrust law is attribu-
table to several related factors: (1) a misconception of the state's
role in the antitrust arena; (2) a lack of strong public leadership;
(3) the opposition of the business community; and (4) public apa-
thy. As least in the twentieth century, antitrust litigation has been
viewed as a federal issue resting in the exclusive domain of the
national government. 249 As a result, the matter was largely ig-
nored at the state level until the recent surge in state enforcement
activity. 250 This general perception, however, is erroneous. The
legislative history of the federal statutes indicates that the states
were intended to be the primary enforcers of the antitrust laws.2 5 '
And the Supreme Court, by narrowing the scope of activities con-
sidered to be "in commerce" for purposes of the federal laws, has
placed an increased emphasis on state antitrust laws and their
enforcement. 252
247. See id. at 549-50, 578-79. A comprehensive analysis of the develop-
ment of state antitrust laws and the policy rationales behind such legislation is
beyond the scope of this article. For more general discussions of the subject,
including its relative priority among state government concerns, see Maness,
supra note 101; Rahl, Towarda Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEx. L. REv. 753
(1961); Note, supra note 181.
248. For a discussion of historical trends in state antitrust enforcement, see
Note, supra note 144, at 550-56, 578-610. This commentator posits several rea-
sons for an overall nationwide reluctance to enforce existing state antitrust laws.
Id. at 569-78. These include the myth of adequate federal enforcement, the
myth of driving business away, public apathy, lack of funds, and lack of exper-
ienced trial attorneys to prosecute cases. Id. The lack of funding or personnel
would appear to be a deficiency in the particular statutory scheme or administra-
tive organization of a given state; but the other factors shed light on Penn-
sylvania's failure to pass antitrust legislation as well as the failure of other states
to enforce existing legislation. For a discussion of the role these factors have
played in Pennsylvania's failure to enact antitrust legislation, see infra notes 249-
70 and accompanying text.
249. For discussions of the misperception that federal antitrust law
preempts state law, or renders it practically useless, see Fellmeth, supra note 95,
at 1, 4; Rahl, supra note 247, at 769-74.
250. For discussions of the discouraging effect that passage of federal anti-
trust law had on state enforcement, see Katz & Horwitz, supra note 3, at 9; Note,
supra note 146, at 550-56.
251. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Sherman Act as it re-
lates to the interaction between federal and state antitrust statutes, see supra
notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
252. See Fellmeth, supra note 95, at 5 & n.16. In GulfOil Corp. v. Copp Paving
Co., the Supreme Court held that the defendant corporation's local sales of
asphaltic concrete for use in construction of interstate highways did not meet the
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The perception of antitrust enforcement as a federal respon-
sibility also displays an ostrich-like approach to a problem of siza-
ble magnitude. 25 3 It ignores the limitations on federal
resources. 254 More importantly, it ignores the fact that the vast
majority of commercial activity occurs within the boundaries of
the Commonwealth. 25 5  Most everyday business transactions,
such as grocery purchases or dry cleaning services, are purely lo-
cal affairs. Yet these transactions are beyond the scope of the fed-
eral laws because of the absence of a nexus with interstate
commerce.
The second reason for Pennsylvania's statutory void is the
absence of a vigorous antitrust proponent. Although the two
most recent Pennsylvania governors endorsed antitrust legisla-
tion, their administrations failed to make passage of these propos-
als a priority.2 56 The Attorney General's office initiated efforts for
a state statute and managed to have several proposals intro-
Robinson Patman Act's jurisdictional requirement of interstate commerce. Gulf
Oil Co. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199 (1974). The Court rejected a
"nexus with interstate commerce" test for whether jurisdictional conditions had
been met. Id. In order to invoke federal jurisdiction, the Court held that a
plaintiff must "prove that apparently local acts in fact have adverse conse-
quences on interstate markets and the interstate flow of goods" and not merely
allege a formalistic "nexus" with interstate commerce. Id. at 202.
On the political side of this issue, it is noteworthy that increased responsi-
bility for antitrust enforcement at the state level is consistent with the theory of
new federalism. See R. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM (1972).
253. For a discussion of the magnitude of local antitrust violations, see
supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
254. As an example of the limitations on federal resources, a staff of fifteen
trial attorneys is responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal and civil
federal antitrust cases in five states, including Pennsylvania. Telephone Inter-
view withJohnJ. Hughes, Chief, Antitrust Division, Middle Atlantic Office, U.S.
Department ofJustice (Apr. 15, 1985).
255. Letter from John J. Hughes, Chief, Antitrust Division, Middle Atlantic
Office, U.S. Department ofJustice to Pennsylvania Attorney General Edward G.
Biester, Jr. (Sept. 20, 1979) (regarding the resource contraints of the regional
office). Mr. Hughes observed:
Complaints involving purely local matters or matters with minimal in-
terstate contact have been given our lowest priority . ...
[A]ction has been deferred or declined in many local or marginal
interstate matters.
Because of the absence of an antitrust statute in Pennsylvania,
many valid complaints of local anticompetitive behavior . . . have not
received, and will not receive in the future, the prompt attention and
action required.
Id. See also Fellmeth, supra note 95, at 5-6 (describing a similar situation involv-
ing limited resources and large numbers of local claims in California).
256. Former Governor Milton Schapp's 1975 State of the Commonwealth
address identified the passage of antitrust legislation as a priority of his adminis-
tration. Lette& from Deputy Attorney General Gerry Elman to Richard Stern
and Joe Sims, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Apr. 17, 1975);
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duced. 25 7 However, the Commonwealth's leading law enforce-
ment officials have not considered this an important public
crusade. 258 In the legislative sector, there has been a modest
level of support for an antitrust law;25 9 yet, again, it has not been
perceived as a critical issue.260
A third and often cited explanation is the alleged negative
impact of an antitrust law on business.26' Members of the busi-
memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Gerry Elman to Ronald G. Lench
(June 6, 1975).
Similarly, Governor Dick Thornburgh endorsed the idea of a state antitrust
statute in a 1979 legislative address. Biester Endorses Antitrust Proposal, The Patriot
(Harrisburg), Oct. 18, 1979, at 27. See also Ecenbarger, Time the State Enacted an
Antitrust Law, The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 4, 1979, at 7-A, col. 2. The
Thornburgh administration's proposal was embodied in H. 1594, 163rd Pa.
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 1979 Pa. Legis. J. 1489 (June 29, 1979). Interestingly
enough, despite the endorsement of a Republican governor, the bill was re-
ferred to the Business and Commerce Committee and was never called up for
consideration by the Republican chairman of that committee. See id.
257. For a discussion of the proposals put forth by the Attorney General,
see supra note 241 and accompanying text.
258. In ten years, Attorney General Edward Biester was the only leading
law enforcement official in Pennsylvania to hold a press conference on the need
for state antitrust legislation. Office of Attorney General E. Biester, Press Re-
lease (Oct. 17, 1979); Biester Endorses Antitrust Proposal, The Patriot (Harrisburg),
Oct. 18, 1979, at 27.
Until 1979, the antitrust division of the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Of-
fice consisted of a single attorney who dealt primarily with multidistrict cases.
Note, supra note 146, at 587 & n.404; Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Gerry T. Elman to Attorney General Robert P. Kane (Oct., 1, 1976)
(describing the antitrust division's need for staffing). This staffing shortage un-
doubtedly contributed to the low level of involvement and advocacy on the part
of the Attorney General concerning state antitrust legislation. See id.
State attorneys general may be very influential in the passage of state anti-
trust legislation. One commentator has concluded that a primary catalyst for the
revival of state antitrust enforcement in the seventies was the renewed interest
of attorneys general. Kirk, supra note 166, at 246-48. Delaware, like Penn-
sylvania, was without state antitrust legislation in 1979 when Attorney General
Richard S. Gebelein actively supported and won passage of an antitrust law soon
after he was elected. Id. at 249.
259. Numerous legislators have been involved in sponsoring state antitrust
bills. See, e.g., 1977 Pa. Legis.J. 502 (March 30, 1977) (some 88 members of the
Pennsylvania House joined in introducing H. 845, 161st Pa. Cong. (1977) into
the General Assembly). It has been observed that legislative apathy is a signifi-
cant impediment to effective state antitrust enforcement. See Note, supra note
181, at 580 & n.37. Pennsylvania's legislators have been supportive enough to
sponsor numerous proposals; however, no single member has taken a leadership
role on any of these proposals. Such a legislative standstill may be indicative of
an absence of widespread concern.
260. For a review of the ultimate demise of every state antitrust proposal
introduced in the last ten years, see supra note 241.
261. Note, supra note 146, at 574; Note, supra note 181, at 579; Memoran-
dum from Martin H. Katz, Deputy Attorney General, to Louis B. Kozloff, Execu-
tive Director, Consumer Affairs Committee, Pennsylvania House of
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ness community express fears that a state antitrust law will have a
deleterious effect on business, will create an unfavorable business
climate and will ultimately cause businesses to move out of the
Commonwealth.2 62 These fears are largely without founda-
tion.263 Indeed, if these expressions were accurate, Pennsylvania
would be a businessperson's paradise. It is well established that
the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote a healthy free
economy where businesses can openly and fairly compete. 264
Trade restraints violate this free market system. Small businesses
and consumers can only benefit from the protection of an anti-
trust law. Even if an antitrust statute were to cause some busi-
nesses to leave the Commonwealth, any resulting loss of revenue
must be balanced against the costs of trade restraints through in-
flated prices and business closings. 265
Finally, there is no active constituency requesting this kind of
legislation in Pennsylvania. 266 Although antitrust legislation has
been accurately characterized as a consumer issue, 267 the organ-
ized consumer lobby has not recognized it as such. 268 Public in-
Representatives (May 25, 1978) (responding to Chamber of Commerce con-
cerns over a possible detrimental impact of state antitrust law on business).
Passage of state antitrust legislation in Delaware, a state known for its
friendliness to corporate interests, demonstrates by example that the fear that
passing state antitrust laws will drive business away is groundless. For a discus-
sion of Delaware's new antitrust statute, see Kirk, supra note 166. Although
compromises were made in order to secure passage of the bill, the modified
proposal ultimately won the support of Delaware's Chamber of Commerce. See
id. at 249. Yet Delaware remains a popular corporate domicile. Id.
262. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). In
Topco, the Supreme Court observed that antitrust laws
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our funda-
mental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to
assert with vigor, imagination, devotion and ingenuity whatever eco-
nomic muscle it can muster.
Id. See also 1982 NAAG QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 159 (discussing the purpose
and benefits of state antitrust legislation).
263. See Note, supra note 146, at 574 ("A competitive market may be as
likely to attract business as to drive it away."); Note, supra note 181, at 579-80.
264. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
265. See generally Note, supra note 181, at 579-80; Note, supra note 146, at
574.
266. For discussions of the discouraging effect of the lack of public interest
in state antitrust enforcement, see Note, supra note 181, at 580.
267. See Memorandum, supra note 261 (characterizing antitrust law as a
consumer issue).
268. For an example of the lack of consumer involvement, see Trinkle,
supra note 241, at 12 (one piece of proposed antitrust legislation was temporarily
released from committee for the express purpose of engendering public feed-
back and not one private individual responded).
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terest organizations are constantly plagued by a lack of resources.
Diverse interest groups may form coalitions to influence certain
issues, but, for the most part, these groups remain fragmented.
As a result, the consumer lobby's effectiveness is greatly impeded.
Consumers who ultimately suffer the most harm from unlawful
overcharges are usually unknowing and silent victims of antitrust
violations. 269 Finally, the inadequacy of remedies for injured pri-
vate parties contributes to the lack of public support for antitrust
programs .270
The foregoing discussion outlines four reasons for Penn-
sylvania's statutory void. Yet two of them are based on erroneous
perceptions of the function and role of an antitrust law. It is the
remaining two, lack of public leadership and lack of grass roots
support, that are the primary substantive factors contributing to
this vacuum. These two factors operate in tandem; the develop-
ment of one will bolster the other. Given the present demon-
strated public apathy and the silent invidious nature of trade
restraints, however, it is incumbent upon public officials to initi-
ate and advocate an antitrust law. Public pressure, which is criti-
cal to the success of local antitrust prosecution, as well as
enactment of legislation, will then follow. 271
VI. THE FUTURE OF ANTITRUST LEGISLATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
Will Pennsylvania's Antibid-Rigging Act develop into a full
antitrust statute to include other trade restraints? Or is it the
269. Consumers may be direct victims of overcharges via price fixing by
local businesses, or they may be indirect victims, through higher taxes or re-
duced government services as a result of overcharges on public contracts. See
Fellmeth, supra note 95, at 7-8; Note, supra note 181, at 585.
270. For a discussion of the effect of the failure to provide adequate private
remedies to those injured by antitrust violations, see Note, supra note 181, at
584. By way of contrast, the federal government's enforcement scheme ac-
knowledges the importance of private enforcement by providing generous pri-
vate remedies. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
271. In discussing the importance of public support to successful state anti-
trust enforcement, one commentator has observed:
It is a somewhat surprising but unfortunate reality that the success of
antitrust prosecution, to the extent success has been achieved, rests
with the public. It is the members of the public who widely support the
concept of free competition, free choice, the survival of small business
and antitrust prosecution. It is the public which reproves violators se-
verely and which thus forms, perhaps, the most potent sanction from
the point of view of suspects: the public humiliation and loss of busi-
ness which can accompany a successful antitrust prosecution.
Fellmeth, supra note 95, at 46.
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maximum protection that will be afforded to the Common-
wealth's citizens and businesses?
Based on the foregoing analysis it appears that a Penn-
sylvania antitrust statute will not become a reality. The common
law on restraint of trade contains only a general prohibition.
There have been no judicial innovations which have expanded the
common law. Pennsylvania's legislative history in the antitrust
area is dismal, showing little interest for antitrust legislation and
no public support. No individual legislator made this issue a pri-
ority and gubernatorial leadership has been weak.
Pennsylvania's only hope for an antitrust law is strong public
leadership. In Delaware, a corporate haven, an antitrust law was
recently enacted.2 72 The attorney general's support and advocacy
were critical factors in securing passage of that law.273 Under the
leadership of a public official who is dedicated to passage of such
a law, business opposition will decrease and public support will
follow. If an antitrust law can be passed in Delaware, it is not an
impossible mission in Pennsylvania. Until then, the Antibid-Rig-
ging Act will remain the only trade regulation protecting consum-
ers and honest businesses in the Commonwealth.
APPENDIX
THE PENNSYLVANIA ANTIBID-RIGGING ACT*
Section 1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the Antibid-Rig-
ging Act.
Section 2. Definitions.
The following words and phrases when used in this act shall
have the meanings given to them in this section unless the context
clearly indicates otherwise.
"Bid-rigging." The concerted activity of two or more per-
sons to determine in advance the winning bidder of a contract let
or to be let for competitive bidding by a governmental agency. It
272. 62 Del. Laws 89 (1979) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2101 to
1-104 (Supp. 1982). For a discussion of the provisions of Delaware's new act,
see Kirk, supra note 166, at 251-60.
273. For a discussion of the Delaware Attorney General's involvement in
passage of the state's new antitrust act, see Kirk, supra note 166, at 249-51, 263.
* Codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1611-1620 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
[Vol. 30: p. 63
48
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss1/2
PENNSYLVANIA'S ANTIBID-RIGGING ACT
shall include, but not be limited to, any one or more of the
following:
(1) Agreeing to sell items or services at the same
price.
(2) Agreeing to submit identical bids.
(3) Agreeing to rotate bids.
(4) Agreeing to share profits with a contractor who
does not submit the low bid.
(5) Submitting prearranged bids, agreed upon
higher or lower bids, or other complementary bids.
(6) Agreeing to set up territories to restrict
competition.
(7) Agreeing not to submit bids.
"Governmental agency." The Commonwealth and any of its
departments, boards, agencies, authorities and commissions, any
political subdivisions, municipal corporations, home rule munici-
palities, school districts and any of their agencies, boards, com-
missions or authorities.
"Person." Any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion or other entity organized for the purpose of doing business
as a contractor, sub-contractor or supplier.
Section 3. Prohibited activities.
(a) Bid-rigging unlawful.-It shall be unlawful for any per-
son to conspire, collude or combine with another in order to
commit or attempt to commit bid-rigging involving:
(1) A contract for the purchase of equipment, goods,
services or materials or for construction or repair let or to be let
by a governmental agency.
(2) A subcontract for the purchase of equipment,
goods, services, or materials or for construction or repair with a
prime contractor or proposed prime contractor for a governmen-
tal agency.
(b) Simultaneous bids.-Notwithstanding other provisions
of this act, it shall not be unlawful for the same person to simulta-
neously submit bids for the same work, or a portion thereof, as a
proposed prime contractor and subcontractor.
(c) Fines and imprisonment.-Every person who violates
this section commits a felony of the third degree and shall, upon
conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine not to exceed $1,000,000, if
an entity other than an individual, or a fine not to exceed
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$50,000, if an individual, or to serve a term of imprisonment for
not more than three years, or both.
(d) Alternative civil penalty.-In lieu of criminal prosecu-
tion for violation of this section, the Attorney General may bring
an action for a civil penalty. In this action, a person found by a
court to have violated this section shall be liable for a civil penalty
of not more than $100,000.
(e) Disposition of fines and penalties.-Criminal fines and
civil penalties collected under subsections (c) and (d) shall be
paid into the State Treasury and deposited in the appropriate
fund.
(f) Factors to be considered in determining fines, imprison-
ment or civil penalties.-In determining the appropriate sanc-
tions to be imposed for a violation of this section, the court shall
consider at least the following three factors:
(1) The prior record and the number of previous
violations.
(2) The net worth of the person.
(3) The size and amount of the contract involved.
(g) Civil actions not barred.-Any conviction or civil pen-
alty imposed under this section shall not bar the governmental
agency from pursuing additional civil actions and administrative
sanctions.
(h) Limitation on prosecution.-No criminal prosecution
under this section shall be brought against a person who has been
previously charged by information or indictment with a criminal
violation of the Federal antitrust laws, based upon the same alleg-
edly unlawful conduct upon which a criminal prosecution under
this act could be based, where jeopardy has attached under the
Federal prosecution.
Section 4. Civil action and damages.
(a) Government agency to have right of action.-Any gov-
ernmental agency entering into a contract which is or has been
the subject of activities prohibited by section 3 shall have a right
of action against the participants in the prohibited activities to re-
cover damages.
(b) Options.-The governmental agency shall have the op-
tion to proceed jointly and severally in a civil action against any
one or more of the participants for recovery of the full amount of
the damages. There shall be no right to contribution among par-
ticipants not named defendants by the governmental agency.
(c) Measure of damages.-The measure of damages recov-
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erable under this section shall be the actual damages, which dam-
ages shall be trebled plus the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(d) When cause of action arises.-The cause of action shall
arise at the time the governmental agency which entered into the
contract discovered, or should have discovered, the conduct
amounting to the offense declared to be unlawful by this act. The
action shall be brought within four years of the date that the cause
of action arose. No civil action shall be maintained after the expi-
ration of ten years from the date the contract was signed by the
parties.
(e) Conviction to be dispositive of liability.-Any conviction
under section 3 shall be dispositive of the liability of the partici-
pants with the only issues for trial being the fact of damage and
amount of damages.
Section 5. Suspension or debarment
(a) Maximum suspension or debarment.-A governmental
agency proceeding under its rules and regulations to exclude or
render ineligible a person from participation in contracts or sub-
contracts based upon conduct prohibited by section 3 shall limit
the exclusion or ineligibility to a period not to exceed the follow-
ing time periods:
(1) Three years in the case of a person found for the
first time to have engaged in this conduct.
(2) Five years in the case of a person found to have en-
gaged in this conduct for a second or subsequent time.
(b) Lists of persons excluded.-A governmental agency that
lets a contract by competitive bidding shall maintain a current list
of persons excluded or ineligible by reason of suspension or de-
barment for participation in contracts or subcontracts with that
agency and shall furnish a copy of the list upon request to a per-
son considering the submission of a bid as a prime contractor or a
subcontractor.
Section 6. Liability for increased costs.
A person who enters into a contract with a governmental
agency, either directly as a contractor or indirectly as a subcon-
tractor, during a period of suspension or debarment imposed
upon that person by that agency under its rules and regulations
shall be liable to the governmental agency and to an eligible con-
tractor for increased costs incurred as a result of replacing the
excluded or ineligible person.
Section 7. Noncollusion affidavits.
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Noncollusion affidavits may be required by rule of any gov-
ernmental agency from all persons. Any such requirement shall
be set forth in the invitation to bid. Failure of any person to pro-
vide a required affidavit to the governmental agency may be
grounds for disqualification of his bid. Any required noncollu-
sion affidavit shall state whether or not the person has been con-
victed or found liable for any act prohibited by State or Federal
law in any jurisdiction involving conspiracy or collusion with re-
spect to bidding on any public contract within the last three years.
Any required noncollusion affidavit shall also state that a person's
affidavit stating that the person has been convicted or found liable
for any act, prohibited by State or Federal law in any jurisdiction,
involving conspiracy or collusion with respect to bidding on any
public contract within the last three years, does not prohibit a
governmental agency from accepting a bid from or awarding a
contract to that person, but may be a ground for administrative
suspension or debarment in the discretion of a governmental
agency under the rules and regulations of that agency, or, in the
case of a governmental agency with no administrative suspension
or debarment regulations or procedures, may be a ground for
consideration on the question whether such agency should de-
cline to award a contract to that person on the basis of a lack of
responsibility. The provisions of this section are in addition to
and not in derogation of any other powers and authority of any
governmental agency.
Section 8. Responsibility for enforcement.
(a) Criminal prosecution.-The Office of Attorney General
and the district attorneys of the several counties shall have con-
current jurisdiction for the investigation and prosecution of viola-
tions of section 3.
(b) Civil actions.-The Office of Attorney General shall
have the authority to bring civil actions under section 4 on behalf
of the Commonwealth and any of its departments, boards, agen-
cies, authorities and commission. Political subdivisions, munici-
pal corporations, home rule municipalities and school districts
shall have the right to bring a civil action under section 4. Upon
the filing of a complaint, a copy thereof shall be served on the
Attorney General. The plaintiff, at any time, may request the At-
torney General to act on its behalf. The Attorney General, upon
determining that it is in the best interest of the Commonwealth,
shall have the authority to intervene on behalf of the Common-
wealth in such actions.
[Vol. 30: p. 63
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(a) Required attendance.-Whenever the Office of Attorney
General believes that a person may be in possession, custody or
control of documentary material or may have information rele-
vant to the subject matter of a civil investigation for the purpose
of ascertaining whether a person is or has been engaged in a vio-
lation of this act, he may require the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of books, accounts, papers, records,
documents and files relating to the civil investigation; and, for this
purpose, the Attorney General or his representatives may-sign
subpoenas, administer oaths or affirmations, examine witnesses
and receive evidence during the investigation. A request for in-
formation shall state the subject matter of the investigation, the
conduct constituting the alleged violation which is under investi-
gation and the provisions of this act applicable to the alleged vio-
lation. A request for documentary material shall describe the
material to be produced with reasonable particularity so as to
fairly identify the documents demanded, provide a return date
within which the material is to be produced and identify the mem-
ber of the Attorney General's staff to whom the material shall be
given. In case of disobedience of a subpoena or the contumacy of
a witness appearing before the Attorney General or his represen-
tative, the Attorney General or his representative may invoke the
aid of a court of record of the Commonwealth, and the court may
thereupon issue an order requiring the person subpoenaed to
obey the subpoena or to give evidence or to produce books, ac-
counts, papers, records, documents and files relative to the mat-
ter in question. Failure to obey an order of the court may be
punished by the court as a contempt.
(b) Confidentiality.-No information or documentary mate-
rial produced under a demand under this section shall, unless
otherwise ordered by a court for good cause shown, be produced
for inspection or copying by, nor shall the contents thereof be
disclosed to, a person other than the Attorney General or his rep-
resentative without the consent of the person who produced the
information or material; except that the Attorney General or his
representative shall disclose information or documentary material
produced under this section or information derived therefrom to
officials of a governmental agency affected by the alleged viola-
tion, for use by that agency in connection with an investigation or
proceeding within its jurisdiction and authority, upon the prior
certification of an appropriate official of the agency that the infor-
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mation shall be maintained in confidence other than use for offi-
cial purposes. Under reasonable terms and conditions as the
Attorney General or his representative shall prescribe, the docu-
mentary material shall be available for inspection and copying by
the person who produced the material or a duly authorized repre-
sentative of that person. The Attorney General or his representa-
tive may use such documentary material or information or copies
thereof as he determines necessary in the civil enforcement of this
act, including presentation before any court. Material which con-
tains trade secrets or other highly confidential matter shall not be
presented except with the approval of the court in which a pro-
ceeding is pending after adequate notice to the person furnishing
the material.
(c) Limitation on use.-No criminal prosecution under sec-
tion 3 may be brought by either the Attorney General or a district
attorney based solely upon information or documents obtained in
a civil investigation under this section.
Section 10. Applicability.
This act shall apply to all contracts with governmental agen-
cies entered into on or after the effective date of this act.
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